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I. INTRODUCTION 
An agency that fails to adequately consider the costs and benefits of its 
proposed regulatory changes increasingly places its rules at risk upon judicial 
review. Over the last couple of decades, courts have begun to expect agencies 
to use regulatory analysis techniques like cost-benefit analysis to justify their 
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regulatory choices. This development poses particularly acute risks for the 
independent regulatory agencies, because their draft regulations are not 
reviewed by the Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs (OIRA), the 
White House experts on cost-benefit analysis who are responsible for executive 
branch regulatory review. Independent regulatory agencies are taking various 
steps to improve their regulatory analysis, but none have fully opted in to 
OIRA’s regulatory review, likely because they expect that OIRA review 
portends the end of their ability to make independent decisions.  
But what if it did not? A recent agreement about tax regulations disrupted 
the conventional understanding about OIRA review, showing that it is not one-
size-fits-all and can instead be tailored to suit the unique features of an agency.1 
“Bespoke” clothing is tailor-made rather than mass-produced.2 Bespoke 
regulatory review, fit to the particulars of each independent regulatory agency, 
could help remedy regulatory analysis deficiencies at independent regulatory 
agencies, while also addressing the long-standing legal and political stalemate 
of OIRA’s review of independent regulatory agencies. In Presidential 
Administration, Elena Kagan described the “energy” and “dynamic charge” that 
the president can inject into the policymaking process to solve problems.3 
Bespoke regulatory review, which is an extension of current practice, offers a 
way to channel this energy to improve regulatory analysis and, therefore, 
decisions. 
Part II summarizes the increased court scrutiny of agency regulatory 
analysis; a feature of the last two decades. Part III explains why this poses acute 
risks for the independent regulatory agencies, which do not undergo OIRA 
review. Part IV shows the flaws of current proposals that call for OIRA’s review 
of independent regulatory agencies. Part V offers the idea of bespoke regulatory 
review, bilateral memoranda of agreement between OIRA and the independent 
regulatory agencies, and explains how and why it could work. 
II. THE RISE OF JUDICIAL REVIEW OF REGULATORY ANALYSIS 
Although it has gone somewhat unnoticed in larger discussions of 
administrative law and other fields, a well-established line of scholarship has 
 
 1 U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY & OFFICE OF INFO. AND REGULATORY AFFAIRS, 
MEMORANDUM OF AGREEMENT: THE DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY AND THE OFFICE OF 
MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET REVIEW OF TAX REGULATIONS UNDER EXECUTIVE ORDER 
12866, at 1 (Apr. 11, 2018), https://home.treasury.gov/sites/default/files/2018-04/04-11%20 
Signed%20Treasury%20OIRA%20MOA.pdf [https://perma.cc/39VR-JTBK] [hereinafter 
MEMORANDUM OF AGREEMENT]. 
 2 “Bespoke” means “[a] garment cut by an individual, for an individual” that is “cut 
from a pattern made specifically for a particular client (i.e. the material is spoken for), 
whereas a made-to-measure suit is cut from a standard pattern and amended to suit the 
contours of the individual. The difference is vast.” RICHARD WALKER, THE SAVILE ROW 
STORY 6 (Linda Osband ed., 1988).  
 3 Elena Kagan, Presidential Administration, 114 HARV. L. REV. 2245, 2339, 2384 
(2001). 
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documented the increasing influence of regulatory analysis techniques like cost-
benefit analysis on judicial review of agency rulemaking, especially over the 
last two decades.4 This has occurred at the Supreme Court and the lower courts, 
including, but not limited to, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of 
Columbia.5 While some have expressed concern about how and whether judges 
should consider economic analysis in the course of their review,6 the fact 
remains that they are doing so. This shift, which has been taking place at the 
Supreme Court since 2001, creates new pressure on all rulemaking agencies, but 
especially the independent regulatory agencies, as will be explained in Part III. 
This judicial pressure to offer more regulatory analysis creates an opportunity 
to revisit OIRA’s role with respect to these agencies. 
In The Cost-Benefit Revolution, Cass R. Sunstein explained that “[t]he 
number of decisions that scrutinize agency failure to engage in cost-benefit 
analysis or to give adequate consideration to it is large and growing.”7 However, 
this level of scrutiny was not present in 2001. That year, in Whitman v. American 
Trucking Associations, Inc.,8 the Court held that Section 109 of the Clean Air 
Act did not permit the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) to use cost-
 
 4 AFL-CIO v. OSHA, 965 F.2d 962, 975 (11th Cir. 1992); Corrosion Proof Fittings v. 
EPA, 947 F.2d 1201, 1215 (5th Cir. 1991); Reeve Bull & Jerry Ellig, Judicial Review of 
Regulatory Impact Analysis: Why Not the Best?, 69 ADMIN. L. REV. 725, 728 (2017) 
(“Federal courts have increasingly come to view as per se irrational agency action that 
ignores the economic considerations associated with a contemplated course of action 
(assuming no statutory prohibition on reviewing such economic considerations exists).”); 
Caroline Cecot & W. Kip Viscusi, Judicial Review of Agency Benefit-Cost Analysis, 22 GEO. 
MASON L. REV. 575, 575–76, 605 (2015) (“Courts are . . . increasingly requiring agencies to 
quantify benefits and costs to the extent possible.”); Jonathan S. Masur & Eric A. Posner, 
Cost-Benefit Analysis and the Judicial Role, 85 U. CHI. L. REV. 935, 970–76 (2018); Richard 
L. Revesz, Cost-Benefit Analysis and the Structure of the Administrative State: The Case of 
Financial Services Regulation, 34 YALE J. ON REG. 545, 547–48 (2017) (“[T]he requirement 
that the financial regulatory agencies engage in cost-benefit analysis is now likely to become 
more prevalent.”); Catherine M. Sharkey, State Farm “With Teeth”: Heightened Judicial 
Review in the Absence of Executive Oversight, 89 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1589, 1622–30 (2014); 
Cass R. Sunstein, Cost-Benefit Analysis and Arbitrariness Review, 41 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 
1, 11 (2017) [hereinafter, Sunstein, Cost-Benefit Analysis]; Christopher Carrigan, Jerry Ellig, 
& Zhoudan Xie, Regulatory Impact Analysis and Litigation Risk 5 (Nov. 2019) (unpublished 
manuscript) (on file with the Ohio State Law Journal). But see Amy Sinden, A ‘Cost-Benefit 
State’? Reports of Its Birth Have Been Greatly Exaggerated, 46 ENVTL. L. REP. 10933, 
10934 (2016). See generally Cass R. Sunstein, The Cost-Benefit State (Coase-Sandor Inst. 
for Law & Econ., Working Paper No. 39, 1996), https://chicagounbound.uchicago.edu/cgi/ 
viewcontent.cgi?article=1497&context=law_and_economics [https://perma.cc/W3FL-2VUL] 
(tracing this back to Industrial Union Department, AFL-CIO v. American Petroleum 
Institute, 448 U.S. 607, 610 (1980)).  
 5 Sinden, supra note 4, at 10941–42. 
 6 Bull & Ellig, supra note 4, at 729–30; Cecot & Viscusi, supra note 4, at 606; Revesz, 
supra note 4, at 548. But see Sinden, supra note 4, at 10941. 
 7 CASS R. SUNSTEIN, THE COST-BENEFIT REVOLUTION 153 (2018). 
 8 Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass’ns, 531 U.S. 457 (2001). 
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benefit analysis to inform its decision about national air quality standards.9 The 
statutory language directed EPA to select the standards based on “such criteria 
and allowing an adequate margin of safety” that “are requisite to protect the 
public health.”10 Justice Antonin Scalia, writing for the Court, did not see a clear 
“textual commitment” to consideration of costs, and declined to read it in.11  
Justice Scalia changed tack in 2009, writing for the Court in Entergy Corp. 
v. Riverkeeper, Inc..12 There, the Court allowed the EPA to consider costs and 
benefits in regulating under Section 316(b) of the Clean Water Act.13 The statute 
directed EPA to issue regulations that “reflect the best technology available for 
minimizing adverse environmental impact.”14 The Court was persuaded that the 
“best” technology could be the one that is most efficient, such that it includes 
consideration of costs.15 It continued that “it was well within the bounds of 
reasonable interpretation for the EPA to conclude that cost-benefit analysis is 
not categorically forbidden” in setting a standard under the Clean Water Act.16 
This decision was greeted as a major turning point. One scholar suggested it 
created “a new presumption for the interpretation of ambiguous . . . regulatory 
provisions on the use of [cost-benefit analysis].”17 Others agreed, calling it “a 
shift in Clean Water Act jurisprudence that previously has deemphasized the 
role of economics.”18 
In a somewhat similar vein, the Court decided Environmental Protection 
Agency v. EME Homer City Generation19 in 2014. There, the Court reviewed 
agency construction of the Good Neighbor Provision of the Clean Air Act.20 
That provision was silent with regard to cost.21 The Court permitted EPA to 
 
 9 Id. at 486. 
 10 42 U.S.C. § 7409(b)(1) (2012). 
 11 Am. Trucking, 531 U.S. at 468–69. In a concurring opinion, however, Justice Stephen 
Breyer argued that “other things being equal, we should read silences or ambiguities in the 
language of regulatory statutes as permitting, not forbidding, this type of rational regulation.” 
Id. at 490 (Breyer, J., concurring). He goes on to find that “other things are not equal” in this 
case, because “legislative history, along with the statute’s structure, indicates that § 109’s 
language reflects a congressional decision not to delegate to the agency the legal authority 
to consider economic costs of compliance.” Id.  
 12 Entergy Corp. v. Riverkeeper, Inc., 556 U.S. 208, 226 (2008). 
 13 Id. 
 14 33 U.S.C. § 1326(b) (2012). 
 15 Riverkeeper, 556 U.S. at 218. 
 16 Id. at 209. 
 17 Jonathan Cannon, The Sounds of Silence: Cost-Benefit Canons in Entergy Corp. v. 
Riverkeeper, Inc., 34 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 425, 459 (2010). 
 18 Paul N. Singarella & Marc T. Campopiano, The Role of Economics in Environmental, 
Health, and Safety Regulation After Entergy, 35 ENVIRONS ENVTL. L. & POL’Y J. 101, 105 
(2011). 
 19 EPA v. EME Homer City Generation, 572 U.S. 489 (2014). 
 20 Id. at 495–96. 
 21 42 U.S.C. § 7410(a)(2)(D)(i) (2012). 
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consider cost in construing this provision, with Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg 
writing for the Court that the decision to consider costs “makes good sense.”22 
Building on this reasoning, in 2015 in Michigan v. Environmental 
Protection Agency23 the Court read the phrase “appropriate and necessary” in a 
section of the Clean Air Act as a statutory mandate requiring EPA to weigh costs 
against benefits.24 Justice Scalia wrote for the majority that “[o]ne would not 
say that it is even rational, never mind ‘appropriate,’ to impose billions of dollars 
in economic costs in return for a few dollars in health or environmental 
benefits. . . . No regulation is ‘appropriate’ if it does significantly more harm 
than good.”25 Writing in dissent, Justice Elena Kagan voiced significant support 
for consideration of benefits and costs in regulatory decision-making: “Cost is 
almost always a relevant—and usually, a highly important—factor in regulation. 
Unless Congress provides otherwise, . . . an agency must take costs into account 
in some manner before imposing significant regulatory burdens.”26 Although 
Michigan was a 5–4 decision, between Justice Scalia’s opinion for the majority, 
Justice Thomas’ concurrence, and Justice Kagan’s dissent, “Michigan actually 
counted nine votes for the principle that costs cannot be ignored.”27 
Taking these cases together, in ten years, the Court shifted from needing a 
clear “textual commitment” permitting consideration of costs to finding that a 
statute that did not mention costs nevertheless required their consideration.28 
This was, to put it mildly, “a significant evolution.”29 As summarized by 
Caroline Cecot and W. Kip Viscusi, “it is difficult not to get the impression that 
 
 22 EME Homer City Generation, 572 U.S. at 519. 
 23 Michigan v. EPA, 135 S. Ct. 2699 (2015). 
 24 Id. at 2711–12. 
 25 Id. at 2707. 
 26 Id. at 2716–17 (Kagan, J., dissenting) (citations omitted). This view seems to build 
on then-Professor Kagan’s view of “[t]he ever-widening appreciation of the role of cost-
benefit analysis and comparative risk assessment in the formulation of administrative 
policy.” Kagan, supra note 3, at 2353.  
 27 EPA, 135 S. Ct. at 2716–17 (Kagan, J., dissenting); Brian F. Mannix, Benefit–Cost 
Analysis as a Check on Administrative Discretion, 24 SUP. CT. ECON. REV. 155, 157 (2016). 
 28 The beginnings of the courts’ embrace of regulatory analysis and cost-benefit 
analysis may well run back farther than ten years. Sunstein has written about two influential 
circuit court decisions. Sunstein, The Cost-Benefit State, supra note 4, at 2 n.5; see AFL-CIO 
v. OSHA, 965 F.2d 962 (11th Cir. 1992); Corrosion Proof Fittings v. EPA, 947 F.2d 1201 
(5th Cir. 1991). In Corrosion Proof Fittings, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit 
held that the Environmental Protection Agency failed to consider alternatives as required by 
the relevant statute. Corrosion Proof Fittings, 947 F.2d at 1229. In AFL-CIO, the U.S. Court 
of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit held that Occupational Safety and Health Commission 
erred in setting permissible exposure limits for 428 substances without adequate risk-based 
justification. AFL-CIO, 965 F.2d at 986–87. Similarly, Jonathan S. Masur and Eric A. Posner 
recently argued that Corrosion Proof Fittings and Business Roundtable were “harbingers of 
an era of enhanced judicial review of [cost-benefit analysis].” Masur & Posner, supra note 
4, at 970. 
 29 Masur & Posner, supra note 4, at 975. 
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the Court has become more receptive to the use of [benefit-cost analysis] in the 
thirteen years since American Trucking was decided.”30  
The lower courts are on a similar trajectory. The U.S. Court of Appeals for 
the District of Columbia, which is a specialist on matters of administrative 
law,31 produced a series of decisions involving various regulations from the 
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC).32 The decisions were written 
mostly by former OIRA Administrator Judge Douglas Ginsburg and 
“promot[ed] rigorous [benefit-cost analysis] of financial regulations.”33 Richard 
L. Revesz tracked this back to 1993 in Timpinaro v. SEC,34 in which the court 
remanded a rule “to address the balance of benefits and costs associated” with 
it.35 Revesz cites the 2005 case of U.S. Chamber of Commerce v. Securities and 
Exchange Commission36 and the 2010 case of American Equity Investment Life 
Insurance Co. v. Securities and Exchange Commission37 in which the court 
vacated SEC rules on similar grounds.38 
These cases provided the backdrop for the court’s bombshell decision in 
Business Roundtable v. Securities and Exchange Commission.39 There, the court 
found that a 2010 rule on proxy access was arbitrary and capricious under the 
Administrative Procedure Act.40 In its decision, the court listed SEC’s failure to 
quantify costs as one of several defects in its economic analysis, writing:  
We agree with the petitioners and hold the Commission acted arbitrarily 
and capriciously for having failed once again—as it did most recently in 
American Equity Investment Life Insurance Company v. SEC . . . and 
before that in Chamber of Commerce . . . —adequately to assess the 
economic effects of a new rule. Here the Commission inconsistently and 
opportunistically framed the costs and benefits of the rule; failed 
adequately to quantify the certain costs or to explain why those costs could 
not be quantified; neglected to support its predictive judgments; 
contradicted itself; and failed to respond to substantial problems raised by 
 
 30 Cecot & Viscusi, supra note 4, at 586–87. 
 31 See Patricia M. Wald, Harold Leventhal Talk at the District of Columbia Bar: Thirty 
Years of Administrative Law in the D.C. Circuit (July 1, 1997), https://www.dcbar.org/for-
lawyers/communities/join-a-community/administrative-law-and-agency-practice/harold-lev 
enthal-talk-thirty-years-of-administrati [https://perma.cc/F3T9-W6DF]. 
 32 See generally Robert B. Ahdieh, Reanalyzing Cost-Benefit Analysis: Toward a 
Framework of Function(s) and Form(s), 88 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1983 (2013). 
 33 Cecot & Viscusi, supra note 4, at 587. 
 34 Timpinaro v. SEC, 2 F.3d 453 (D.C. Cir. 1993) (Ginsburg, J., writing for the court). 
 35 Id. at 458; Revesz, supra note 4, at 565. 
 36 Chamber of Commerce v. SEC, 412 F.3d 133 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (Ginsburg, J., writing 
for the court) (vacating for failure to adequately consider costs). 
 37 Am. Equity Inv. Life Ins. Co. v. SEC, 613 F.3d 166 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (Sentelle, J., 
writing for the court) (vacating for failure to adequately consider the rule’s effects). 
 38 Revesz, supra note 4, at 566–67. 
 39 Bus. Roundtable v. SEC, 647 F.3d 1144 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (Ginsburg, J., writing for 
the court); Catherine M. Sharkey, supra note 4, at 1625–28. 
 40 Bus. Roundtable, 647 F.3d at 1144, 1156. 
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commenters. For these and other reasons, its decision to apply the rule to 
investment companies was also arbitrary.41 
Scholars of financial regulation and administrative law have labored to 
analyze the meaning and effects of Business Roundtable.42 Their response was 
“swift and furious” for the most part, criticizing the D.C. Circuit for going 
beyond its appropriate role and interfering with agencies’ abilities to achieve 
their missions.43 Most tended to agree that it, at a minimum, “raised the bar for 
rulemaking for all agencies whose substantive economic analyses could be 
subject to judicial review.”44 Whether it actually raised the substantive decision-
making standard for agencies or not, it placed pressure on agencies to produce 
and share information about economic analysis associated with its regulatory 
decision-making.45 Placing such information into the rulemaking record, in turn, 
paves the way for its scrutiny upon judicial review. 
Ten years after the decision, we can see that Business Roundtable has not, 
for example, resulted in a dramatic uptick in decisions pushing for quantitative 
analysis when the record is not there to support it. It may very well be, as some 
scholars suggested shortly after the decision,46 that the holding is cabined to the 
SEC because of its particular statutory requirements. In support of this idea—
that Business Roundtable’s holding to require quantification has limited 
applicability—two recent decisions from the D.C. Circuit show that agency 
acknowledgement of analytical limits can be viewed favorably by courts. 
In Idaho Conservation League v. Wheeler,47 the petitioners challenged 
EPA’s final rule on financial responsibility requirements for the hardrock 
 
 41 Id. at 1148–49 (emphasis added) (citations omitted). 
 42 See, e.g., Ahdieh, supra note 32, at 2064–65; John C. Coates IV, Cost-Benefit 
Analysis of Financial Regulation: Case Studies and Implications, 124 YALE L.J. 882, 915–
20 (2015); James D. Cox & Benjamin J.C. Baucom, The Emperor Has No Clothes: 
Confronting the D.C. Circuit’s Usurpation of SEC Rulemaking Authority, 90 TEX. L. REV. 
1811, 1833–47 (2012); Grant M. Hayden & Matthew T. Bodie, The Bizarre Law and 
Economics of Business Roundtable v. SEC, 38 J. CORP. L. 101, 107–08 (2012); Bruce Kraus 
& Connor Raso, Rational Boundaries for SEC Cost-Benefit Analysis, 30 YALE J. ON REG. 
289, 290–91 (2013); Yoon-Ho Alex Lee, Essay, An Options Approach to Agency 
Rulemaking, 65 ADMIN. L. REV. 881, 883–86 (2013); Masur & Posner, supra note 4, at 969–
70; Michael E. Murphy, The SEC and the District of Columbia Circuit: The Emergency of a 
Distinct Standard of Judicial Review, 7 VA. L. & BUS. REV. 125, 166–69 (2012); Revesz, 
supra note 4, at 567–68; Sharkey, supra note 4, at 1620–31; Garrett F. Bishop & Michael A. 
Coffee, Note, A Tale of Two Commissions: A Compendium of the Cost-Benefit Analysis 
Requirements Faced by the SEC & CFTC, 32 REV. BANKING & FIN. L. 565, 621–24 (2013); 
Jonathan D. Guynn, Note, The Political Economy of Financial Rulemaking After Business 
Roundtable, 99 VA. L. REV. 641, 641–42 (2013).  
 43 Masur & Posner, supra note 4, at 963 (discussing the scholarly reaction to Business 
Roundtable).  
 44 Lee, supra note 42, at 881, 885.  
 45 Sharkey, supra note 4, at 1646–47. 
 46 See, e.g., Lee, supra note 42, at 885–86. 
 47 Idaho Conservation League v. Wheeler, 930 F.3d 494 (D.C. Cir. 2019). 
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mining industry.48 The economic analysis was alleged to overstate the costs of 
the action while “ignoring its health and environmental benefits.”49 The court 
explained that “[t]he EPA expressly recognized that its estimates” were not built 
for comparison, which “demonstrates that the EPA did not intend to conduct a 
rigorous societal cost-benefit analysis,” but rather “compared in broad strokes 
the potential impact” of its rule.50 The court found that such an approach was 
reasonable and declined to find EPA’s economic analysis arbitrary and 
capricious.51  
In the same year, the D.C. Circuit decided Mozilla Corp. v. Federal 
Communications Commission.52 In this case, the D.C. Circuit devoted a section 
of its opinion to reviewing the agency’s cost-benefit analysis and reviewed 
several substantive aspects of the Federal Communications Commission’s 
(FCC) action in light of economic analysis the FCC provided to justify it.53 
Here, again, the D.C. Circuit looked favorably upon the FCC’s self-described 
limitations of its own analysis. For example, the court supported the FCC’s 
choice to provide qualitative analysis instead of quantitative analysis, 
particularly when there was inadequate information to support anything more.54 
Relatedly, “the court approvingly noted how the FCC . . . acknowledged the 
limitations of some of the studies it relied on and was careful not to make 
excessive claims about what they proved.”55 
While some feared that Business Roundtable would raise the bar for agency 
economic analysis so high that agencies would not be able to clear it, subsequent 
 
 48 Financial Responsibility Requirements Under CERCLA Section 108(b) for Classes 
of Facilities in the Hardrock Mining Industry, 83 Fed. Reg. 7556, 7556 (Feb. 21, 2018) (to 
be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 320). 
 49 Idaho Conservation League, 930 F.3d at 507. 
 50 Id. at 507–08. 
 51 Id. at 508. 
 52 Mozilla Corp. v. FCC, 940 F.3d 1 (D.C. Cir. 2019). 
 53 Id. at 70–73. 
 54 Id. at 70. 
[T]he Commission’s ultimate decision to conduct a qualitative analysis appears 
consistent with [OMB Circular A–4]. The latter provides that ‘where no quantified 
information on benefits, costs, and effectiveness can be produced, the regulatory 
analysis should present a qualitative discussion of the issues and evidence.’ The 
Commission, after finding that ‘the record provides little data that would allow [the 
agency] to quantify the magnitudes of many of’ the costs and benefits, adopted the 
qualitative approach, seeking to assess ‘the direction of the effect on economic 
efficiency.’ 
Id. (citation omitted).  
 55 Jerry Ellig, Implications of Mozilla for Agency Economic Analysis, YALE J. ON REG. 
NOTICE & COMMENT (Oct. 10, 2019), https://www.yalejreg.com/nc/implications-of-mozilla-
for-agency-economic-analysis-by-jerry-ellig/ [https://perma.cc/3ME8-K3J5]. 
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decisions suggest a more nuanced and limited approach.56 Idaho Conservation 
League and Mozilla suggest that while judges are indeed looking more and more 
closely at agency cost-benefit analysis, they are not necessarily looking for air-
tight estimates and demonstrations of certainty. In these two cases, the D.C. 
Circuit declined to overturn agency action, even though, or perhaps because, the 
agency acknowledged its analytical limits. The D.C. Circuit’s approach should 
give those concerned about Business Roundtable some comfort. 
This interest in reviewing agency cost-benefit analysis is not limited to the 
D.C. Circuit; other U.S. Courts of Appeals have weighed in as well. A recent 
study by Cecot and Viscusi reviewed a sample of thirty-eight judicial decisions 
related to agency cost-benefit analysis.57 The sample included cases from ten of 
thirteen federal appellate courts that “implicate” agency cost-benefit analysis.58 
Among many other findings, the authors conclude that courts “generally 
evaluate whether the BCAs include all relevant aspects of the problem, ensuring 
that entire categories of benefits or costs are not omitted from the analysis.”59 
They go on to say that “[c]ourts are . . . increasingly requiring agencies to 
quantify benefits and costs to the extent possible.”60  
In summary, the Supreme Court and the lower courts have been playing a 
role in what then-Professor Elena Kagan described in 2001 as “[t]he ever-
widening appreciation of the role of cost-benefit analysis . . . in the formulation 
of administrative policy.”61 Although opinions are split on how to explain and 
justify this trend towards the use of economic and other regulatory analysis 
principles in judicial review,62 and, probably, the extent to which it is 
normatively desirable, scholars do not appear to disagree that it is happening.63 
 
 56 See Kraus & Raso, supra note 42, at 292 (arguing that Business Roundtable v. SEC 
shows how an “open-ended jurisprudence of economics [in rulemaking] has proven 
increasingly unworkable in practice”). 
 57 Cecot & Viscusi, supra note 4, at 577. 
 58 See id. at 577, 609–11. The sample did not include cases from the U.S. Courts of 
Appeals for the Federal Circuit, Eighth, or Third Circuits. See id. 
 59 Id. at 605. The acronym BCA refers to benefit-cost analysis, which is an alternative 
term for cost-benefit analysis. 
 60 Id. 
 61 Kagan, supra note 3, at 2353. 
 62 Sunstein argues that the Supreme Court cases discussed above, which were not APA 
cases, nevertheless suggest that an agency’s failure to consider costs and benefits, unless 
prohibited from doing so by law, should render an agency’s decision arbitrary and capricious 
under the APA. See generally Sunstein, Cost-Benefit Analysis, supra note 4. This argument 
reads cost-benefit analysis into the APA, which would “make sense of a general trend in the 
case law that transcends the particular statutes under which the agencies regulate.” Masur & 
Posner, supra note 4, at 978. The problem, as noted by Masur and Posner, is that “[t]here is 
no textual hook that connects these cases to the APA.” Id. at 979. They settle, instead, on the 
idea that the courts’ embrace of cost-benefit analysis is defensible as a form of federal 
common law. Id. 
 63 Bull & Ellig, supra note 4, at 727–28; Cecot & Viscusi, supra note 4, at 605 (“Courts 
are . . . increasingly requiring agencies to quantify benefits and costs to the extent 
possible.”); Revesz, supra note 4, at 548 (“[T]he requirement that the financial regulatory 
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III. INCREASED RISK FOR INDEPENDENT REGULATORY AGENCIES 
Increased judicial scrutiny for the economic underpinnings of regulatory 
choices poses particular risks for the set of agencies known as the “independent 
regulatory agencies.” To explain why, this section synthesizes recent 
scholarship revealing that the insulation of independent agencies varies much 
more than commonly understood, describes the special category known as the 
“independent regulatory agencies,” and explains how those agencies are 
uniquely disadvantaged compared to others when it comes to regulatory 
analysis. It is this disadvantage that bespoke regulatory review can help 
overcome. 
A. The Independent Agency 
Independent agencies are a significant portion of the federal government, 
and while their regulations are just as powerful as those from other agencies, 
they conduct their business with a measure of political insulation that other 
agencies do not enjoy. Despite several years of compelling scholarship, the 
quality of this insulation is generally misunderstood to be binary; an absolute. 
However, as a class, the independent agencies have greater ambiguity, and 
failure to recognize this has made them seem untouchable while they are not. 
Independent agencies play an important role in the modern regulatory 
system. Although we lack a precise way to quantify their role, some rough 
measures give a sense of it. In the Spring 2019 edition of the Semiannual Unified 
Regulatory Agenda, a forward-looking document listing planned regulatory 
activity for the coming twelve months, independent agencies expected to 
contribute around twelve percent of upcoming regulatory actions.64 As of 2017, 
independent agencies were responsible for about thirteen percent of the 
“regulatory restrictions” in the Code of Federal Regulations.65 These agencies 
 
agencies engage in cost-benefit analysis is now likely to become more prevalent.”). But see 
Sinden, supra note 4, at 10935. Instead, some discussion has focused on whether judges are 
competent to assess the techniques of regulatory impact analysis, including cost-benefit 
analysis. Masur & Posner, supra note 4, at 949 (“The argument against involving judges is 
based on traditional notions of judicial review: judges, as generalists, are in a weak position 
to evaluate the work of experts.”). Masur and Posner find that judges are capable of such 
review. Id. at 949–50; accord Cecot & Viscusi, supra note 4, at 606 (“[O]ur review of thirty-
eight cases involving BCA does not demonstrate any inability of the courts to grasp the 
economic issues, despite the judges’ professed lack of expertise.”). 
 64 About the Unified Agenda, REGINFO.GOV, https://www.reginfo.gov/public/jsp/e 
Agenda/StaticContent/UA_About.myjsp [https://perma.cc/5THA-HHZY]; Spring 2019 
Unified Agenda of Regulatory and Deregulatory Actions, REGINFO.GOV, https://www.reg 
info.gov/public/do/eAgendaHistory (select “Spring 2019 Unified Agenda of Federal 
Regulatory and Deregulatory Actions”) (calculations on file with author). 
 65 Jerry Ellig, Why and How Independent Agencies Should Conduct Regulatory Impact 
Analysis, 28 CORNELL J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 1, 10 (2018) (using QuantGov data). 
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regulate key sectors of the American economy, from consumer products to 
telecommunications to nuclear power plants.66  
An agency’s independence, or non-independence, has no bearing on its legal 
authority to promulgate rules. Looking at a rule in the Code of Federal 
Regulations, a reader might not be able to discern whether it was the product of 
an independent agency or not. Although the decision-making process might be 
vastly different at a multimember independent agency or commission, compared 
to the process at an agency with a single head,67 the regulatory output from each 
type of agency has the same weight as a matter of law. Independent agencies are 
subject to the Administrative Procedure Act and their rules are proposed in the 
Federal Register and codified in the Code of Federal Regulations just like those 
of other agencies.68 Judicial review, too, is the same.69  
The purpose of agency independence, though, is not to ratchet up or down 
the legal weight of rules based on what kind of agency issues them. Rather, its 
objective is to insert a layer of political insulation between the agency and the 
president or other actors that might seek to control the agency’s decision-
making.70 The animating idea is that the public as a whole can benefit from a 
 
 66 See, e.g., id. 
 67 See, e.g., Kraus & Raso, supra note 42, at 336–38 (describing the effects of the 
Sunshine Act and practice of logrolling at multimember commissions). 
 68 See Peter L. Strauss, The Place of Agencies in Government: Separation of Powers 
and the Fourth Branch, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 573, 585 (1984). 
 69 Id. (“The Administrative Procedure Act applies equally to all agency types. Case law 
involving agency procedure, judicial review, or presidential and congressional oversight 
gives no hint that an agency’s ‘independence’ vel non could be a significant factor in any 
decision about appropriate or fair procedures.”). Some have argued that independent 
agencies may deserve less deference from the courts, as a result of their disconnection from 
the president and his policies. See Kagan, supra note 3, at 2375; Sharkey, supra note 4, at 
1605, 1615–16. 
 70 “They are ‘independent’ of the political will exemplified by the executive branch.” 
MARSHALL J. BREGER & GARY J. EDLES, INDEPENDENT AGENCIES IN THE UNITED STATES: 
LAW, STRUCTURE, AND POLITICS 2 (2015). Breger and Edles provide an excerpt from the 
seminal case Humphrey’s Executor v. United States to illustrate this theory:  
The commission is to be non-partisan; and it must, from the very nature of its duties, 
act with entire impartiality. It is charged with the enforcement of no policy except the 
policy of the law. Its duties are neither political nor executive, but predominantly quasi-
judicial and quasi-legislative . . . . [I]ts members are called upon to exercise the trained 
judgment of a body of experts appointed by law and informed by experience . . . . 
 
[It is] a body of experts who shall gain experience by length of service—a body which 
shall be independent of executive authority, except in its selection, and free to exercise 
its judgment without the leave or hindrance of any other official or any department of 
the government. 
Id. at 2 (quoting Humphrey’s Ex’r v. United States, 295 U.S. 602, 624, 625–26 (1935) 
(internal quotation marks and citation omitted) (emphasis omitted)).  
  In the late nineteenth century and early twentieth century, some of the independent 
agencies, like the Interstate Commerce Commission, were considered to be “arms of the 
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dispassionate, expert decision maker who is insulated from at least some forms 
of politics.71  
This is often the argument for the independence of monetary decisions made 
by the Federal Reserve, for example, because “[t]hough the President and 
[financial] agencies share a common long-term goal of economic growth, 
achieving that goal often requires politically unpopular actions in the short 
term.”72 If the president was involved in raising or lowering interest rates, for 
example, the short-term political consequences of those choices would likely 
interfere with the Federal Reserve’s ability to deliver good long-term 
outcomes.73  
While this makes intuitive sense with respect to interest rates, there is 
agreement that this is a special case.74 There is also an extensive literature that 
explores the constitutional, accountability, and effectiveness problems 
associated with limiting the president’s ability to oversee agency decision-
making.75 Together, this literature undercuts the primary objectives of 
 
Congress” rather than part of the executive branch. Abraham Ribicoff, Congressional 
Oversight and Regulatory Reform, 28 ADMIN. L. REV. 415, 416 (1976). This claim is not 
made about modern independent agencies, but the “arms of the Congress” era can be 
understood to be a legislative “device for opposing the centralization of presidential 
authority.” See Angel Manuel Moreno, Presidential Coordination of the Independent 
Regulatory Process, 8 ADMIN. L.J. AM. U. 461, 467 (1994) (quoting MARVER H. BERNSTEIN, 
REGULATING BUSINESS BY INDEPENDENT COMMISSION 151 (1955)). 
 71 See Rachel E. Barkow, Insulating Agencies: Avoiding Capture Through Institutional 
Design, 89 TEX. L. REV. 15, 19–21 (2010). Also, it is not only insulation from the president 
that matters. Rachel Barkow wrote that “one cannot begin to think about what makes an 
agency independent without thinking about what the agency is supposed to be independent 
of.” Id. at 19. Options include not just the President and Congress, but also special interests 
that can outmaneuver the more diffuse interests of the general public due to collective action 
problems. Id. at 16–17, 22–24. 
 72 Id. at 29. 
 73 See Steven G. Calabresi & Nicholas Terrell, The Fatally Flawed Theory of the 
Unbundled Executive, 93 MINN. L. REV. 1696, 1717 (2009) (noting that “[a] nationally 
elected Federal Reserve Board, for example, might well choose to manipulate interest rates 
to enhance its own reelection chances”). Sarah Binder and Mark Spindel dispute the notion 
that even the Fed is truly independent, however, describing the Fed and Congress 
“interdependent” instead. SARAH BINDER & MARK SPINDEL, THE MYTH OF INDEPENDENCE: 
HOW CONGRESS GOVERNS THE FEDERAL RESERVE 2 (2017). 
 74 See, e.g., Peter Conti-Brown, The Institutions of Federal Reserve Independence, 32 
YALE J. ON REG. 257, 264–65 (2015); Lawrence Lessig & Cass R. Sunstein, The President 
and the Administration, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 2, 108 (1994) (arguing that EPA’s mission is 
categorically different from the Fed’s). 
 75 First, with regard to constitutionality, proponents of the unitary executive theory 
view the executive branch hierarchically, with the president at the top and the independent 
agencies below. See Neomi Rao, Removal: Necessary and Sufficient for Presidential 
Control, 65 ALA. L. REV. 1205, 1207 n.7 (2014). See generally STEVEN G. CALABRESI & 
CHRISTOPHER S. YOO, THE UNITARY EXECUTIVE: PRESIDENTIAL POWER FROM WASHINGTON 
TO BUSH (2008). 
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independent agencies, and therefore calls them into question. Perhaps as a result, 
there have been waves of interest in the study and reform of independent 
agencies.76 Despite periodic efforts to curtail independent agencies, Congress 
sporadically turns to the independent agency model when it creates new 
agencies.77 From 188778 onward, and as recently as 2010,79 when Congress has 
delegated a new set of regulatory powers, it has placed those responsibilities 
into agencies with differing levels of insulation from executive and legislative 
control.80 
The specific reasons why Congress, on occasion, places authority into 
independent agencies as opposed to others are not always clear or consistent: 
“New agency structures often appear to be created in a vacuum or almost by 
 
  Second, one does not have to hold the unitary executive view of government to be 
concerned about the political accountability of independent agencies. The results of 
presidential elections transmit much less directly to independent agencies, because the tenure 
of their heads are generally not tied to any president’s term; unlike the heads of the Cabinet 
agencies, for example. How, then, are independent agencies accountable to the people, 
especially if they also have some insulation from Congress? See Heidi Kitrosser, The 
Accountable Executive, 93. MINN. L. REV. 1741, 1751–60 (2009) (discussing three types of 
accountability); see also Calabresi & Terrell, supra note 73, at 1722–23 (discussing the role 
of accountability in the executive branch). Rachel Barkow astutely notes the trade-offs of 
political insulation: “one person’s political pressure is another person’s democratic 
accountability.” Barkow, supra note 71, at 19. The merits of relieving agency leadership 
from political accountability are contestable. 
  Third, turning to effectiveness, as an experiment in “expert, apolitical” government, 
the independent agency model was not successful, as “by the 1960s, it became clear that 
[independent] agencies faced the same pathologies, such as capture and poor decision 
making, as executive agencies.” Kirti Datla & Richard L. Revesz, Deconstructing 
Independent Agencies (and Executive Agencies), 98 CORNELL L. REV. 769, 771 (2013); see 
also BREGER & EDLES, supra note 70, at 56–57 (describing the shift from reliance upon 
agency expertise to awareness of interest group bargaining); Calabresi & Terrell, supra note 
73, at 1703 (“As we have learned more about the capture of independent regulatory 
commissions and as public choice scholarship has come to prevail, belief in ‘independent’ 
government entities has come to seem like . . . a ‘fable.’ Today, we realize how easy it is for 
special-interest groups and factions to capture the so-called independent regulatory agencies 
just as it is easy for them to capture the oversight committees.”) (footnotes omitted).  
 76 See Moreno, supra note 70, at 481–88 (summarizing historical developments). 
 77 See Datla & Revesz, supra note 75, at 776–80. 
 78 Interstate Commerce Act of 1887, ch. 104, §§ 11, 21, 24 Stat. 379, 383, 387 (1887) 
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 47 U.S.C.); BREGER & EDLES, supra note 70, 
at 31–32 (summarizing the creation of the Interstate Commerce Commission in 1887). 
 79 In 2010, Congress created the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau. Dodd-Frank 
Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111–203, § 1011(a), 124 Stat. 
1376, 1964 (2010). 
 80 See Patrick M. Corrigan & Richard L. Revesz, The Genesis of Independent Agencies, 
92 N.Y.U. L. REV. 637, 643–44 (2017) (finding statistical significance of three factors related 
to creation of agencies with independent features: presidential approval rating, extent of 
majority in the Senate, and alignment between the Senate and the president, but also 
acknowledging the limited explanatory power of these factors). 
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random selection.”81 Perhaps more generously: “The diversity is characteristic 
of our pragmatic ways with government, reflecting the circumstances of the 
particular regulatory regime, the temper of presidential/congressional relations 
at the time, or the perceived success or failure of an existing agency performing 
like functions, more than any grand scheme of government.”82  
Insulation can take a variety of forms.83 For example, it can protect an 
agency’s decisionmakers from influence, through removal protections and 
appointment restrictions.84 It can also exempt an agency from the policy 
processes to which other agencies are subject.85 There are dozens of different 
features that can inform an agency’s independence.86  
Limits to the president’s ability to remove an agency head is considered to 
be the most important of these features.87 Requiring good cause to remove an 
 
 81 Paul R. Verkuil, The Purposes and Limits of Independent Agencies, 1988 DUKE L.J. 
257, 258. “What is lacking in the creation of independent agencies is any attempt in the 
legislative history to explain why Congress (or the President, for that matter) preferred one 
organizational format over the other.” Id. 
 82 Strauss, supra note 68, at 584–85; see also DAVID E. LEWIS & JENNIFER L. SELIN, 
ADMIN. CONFERENCE OF THE U.S., SOURCEBOOK OF UNITED STATES EXECUTIVE AGENCIES 
34 (1st ed. Dec. 2012), https://www.acus.gov/sites/default/files/documents/Sourcebook-
2012-Final_12-Dec_Online.pdf [https://perma.cc/A22F-6Q2H] [hereinafter LEWIS & SELIN, 
SOURCEBOOK] (noting that the “status and location of agencies is the subject of political 
determination” and the absence of a consciously executed “fundamental constitutional or 
management principle”); Datla & Revesz, supra note 75, at 770–72, 776–78 (summarizing 
the ebb and flow of interest in agency independence); David E. Lewis & Jennifer L. Selin, 
Political Control and the Forms of Agency Independence, 83 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1487, 
1490 (2015) [hereinafter Lewis & Selin, Political Control] (“[C]hoices of insulation are not 
always based upon high-minded efforts associated with quasi-legislative or quasi-judicial 
activities. Indeed, sometimes the only way a legislative deal gets made to enact a new policy 
is when legislators agree to create a new insulated agency to implement the policy. In a less 
rosy version of the politics of agency design, opponents of a new proposed policy insist on 
provisions in the new law that privilege some interests over others and limit the ability of 
political actors to intervene.”). 
 83 See Barkow, supra note 71, at 42–49; Jennifer L. Selin, What Makes an Agency 
Independent?, 59 AM. J. POL. SCI. 971, 971 (2015), http://publish.illinois.edu/jselin/files/ 
2014/07/SelinIndepCodebook.pdf [https://perma.cc/NBM9-YKHD] [hereinafter Selin, 
What Makes an Agency Independent?]. See generally Datla & Revesz, supra note 75.  
 84 Lewis & Selin, Political Control, supra note 82, at 1508. 
 85 Id. 
 86 Selin, supra note 83, at 976 (discussing fifty structural features of agencies that 
combine for more or less independence). There are more subtle authorities that could be 
mapped as well, such as inclusion or exclusion from government-wide procurement policies, 
personnel policy, grants policy, etc. See, e.g., Strauss, supra note 68, at 587. 
 87 LEWIS & SELIN, SOURCEBOOK, supra note 82, at 49 n.133 (“Most existing scholarship 
recognizes some clustering of design characteristics that together signify independence, but 
the most important characteristic appears to be protections against removal.”); Lisa Schultz 
Bressman & Robert B. Thompson, The Future of Agency Independence, 63 VAND. L. REV. 
599, 610 (2010) (explaining that while independent agencies can have various unique 
attributes and features, for-cause removal strips the president of the “ultimate sanction” to 
direct agency behavior). 
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official places a strong check on the president’s ability to influence that 
official.88 Surprisingly, though, some independent agencies lack statutory 
removal protection, most notably the Federal Communications Commission 
(FCC) and Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC).89 Instead, Wiener v. 
United States grants them implied for cause removal protections.90 And the 
 
 88 The power to remove is an “indispensable aid” to “effective enforcement of the law” 
due to its “disciplinary influence.” Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 132 (1926). “[I]t is 
quite evident that one who holds his office only during the pleasure of another, cannot be 
depended upon to maintain an attitude of independence against the latter’s will.” 
Humphrey’s Ex’r v. United States, 295 U.S. 602, 629 (1935). 
  Removal protections are varied in form (e.g., “inefficiency, neglect of duty, or 
malfeasance in office”), but they operate in stark contrast to those positions without them, 
whose occupants serve at the pleasure of the president and can be removed for any reason. 
See Myers, 272 U.S. at 171; Datla & Revesz, supra note 75, at 787–89 (describing the variety 
of removal provisions); see also Neal Devins, Political Will and the Unitary Executive: What 
Makes an Independent Agency Independent?, 15 CARDOZO L. REV. 273, 278 (1993) (noting 
that removal protections allow agency heads to be “secure in their offices” and “better able 
to defy [e]xecutive wishes and assert independent authority”); Richard H. Pildes & Cass R. 
Sunstein, Reinventing the Regulatory State, 62 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 25 (1995) (describing that 
an agency head risks his job by defying the president and therefore has an incentive to 
comply with the president). The practical power of removal can be overstated, though. See, 
e.g., Datla & Revesz, supra note 75, at 813 (describing political cost to the president of 
removing agency heads); Kagan, supra note 3, at 2273 (describing the surveillance costs of 
supervision). 
 89 Communications Act of 1934, ch. 651, § 4, 48 Stat. 1064, 1066 (1934) (codified as 
amended at 47 U.S.C. § 151) (establishing the structure of the FCC); see also Adrian 
Vermeule, Conventions of Agency Independence, 113 COLUM. L. REV. 1163, 1165–66, 
1168–74 (2013) (describing more examples of “independent” agencies without for cause 
removal). See generally Note, The SEC Is Not an Independent Agency, 126 HARV. L. REV. 
781 (2013).  
 90 Wiener v. United States, 357 U.S. 349, 356 (1958). In Wiener, the Supreme Court 
considered whether the head of the now-defunct War Claims Commission was removed 
unlawfully. Id. The statute that created the commission did not have a removal provision. Id. 
at 350. The Court held that some agencies enjoy “absolute freedom from Executive 
interference,” as a result of the “sharp line of cleavage” drawn on the basis of removal 
protections. Id. at 353. It then considered the functions of the War Claims Commission and, 
finding similarities to the Federal Trade Commission, which has for cause removal 
protections, implied for cause removal limitations for the War Claims Commission as well. 
Id. at 353–54.  
  Writing in 1980, Paul Verkuil correctly foresaw the likelihood that this holding 
would be extended to other agencies. Paul R. Verkuil, Jawboning Administrative Agencies: 
Ex Parte Contacts by the White House, 80 COLUM. L. REV. 943, 954 n.65 (1980) (noting that 
the holding in Wiener v. United States presumably extends to other independent agencies 
without explicit for-cause removal protection). Later, and at the behest of agencies arguing 
for protection, both the D.C. Circuit and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit 
found for-cause removal protection at the Securities and Exchange Commission and Federal 
Election Commission. SEC v. Blinder, Robinson & Co., 855 F.2d 677, 681 (10th Cir. 1988) 
(“[The court] accept[s] appellants’ assertions in their brief, that it is commonly understood 
that the President may remove a commissioner only for ‘inefficiency, neglect of duty or 
malfeasance in office.”); Datla & Revesz, supra note 75, at 778–81, 779 n.52 (citing FEC v. 
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presence of an insulating feature can be just as surprising as its absence. For 
example, the head of the Social Security Administration, which is generally not 
considered to be independent, has for cause removal protection.91 In sum, it is 
simply not the case that even this most powerful form of insulation—removal—
offers a clear, dividing line between “independent” and “not independent.” 
And this uneven distribution of insulating features is not limited to removal 
protections.92 Variation occurs with appointment restrictions, such as the choice 
to organize agencies into multimember bodies93 with fixed, staggered terms94 
and other composition limits of varying kinds.95 It also occurs with various 
forms of insulation for agency decision-making, such as budget96 and other 
 
NRA Political Victory Fund, 6 F.3d 821, 826 (D.C. Cir. 1993)) (“The commission suggests 
that the President can remove the commissioners only for good cause, which limitation is 
implied by the Commission’s structure and mission as well as the commissioners’ terms.”). 
The argument in these appeals court decisions has been that, even if Congress did not 
expressly say that an agency head is entitled to removal protections, one can imply such 
protections if the agency is otherwise similar to agencies with removal protections. In 
essence, “omission of a for-cause removal protection provision must have been a drafting 
error.” Datla & Revesz, supra note 75, at 780. Datla and Revesz argue persuasively that 
Wiener and the cases that followed “were incorrectly decided because their central premise—
that the presence of certain features of independence is evidence of congressional intent to 
endow an agency with other features of independence—is wrong.” Id. at 833. 
 91 42 U.S.C. § 902(a)(3) (2012). 
 92 For an excellent and comprehensive survey of the distribution of these different 
features, consult Jennifer Selin’s excellent resource, the Independent Agency Codebook, 
which she makes freely available. See generally Selin, What Makes an Agency Independent?, 
supra note 83. 
 93 See Bressman & Thompson, supra note 87, at 611 (“[T]he collective-board structure 
inhibits political control because politicians or regulated entities must capture a majority of 
the membership rather than just one individual.”); Datla & Revesz, supra note 75, at 794–
97. 
 94 See Datla & Revesz, supra note 75, at 789–92. 
 95 See Bressman & Thompson, supra note 87, at 611 (“[T]he requirement that members 
of independent agencies represent both political parties is an overt attempt at achieving 
political balance.”); Datla & Revesz, supra note 75, at 797–99. Other limitations seemed 
aimed at diversity, as well. The Federal Reserve requires geographic and sectoral diversity. 
LEWIS & SELIN, SOURCEBOOK, supra note 82, at 103 (Table 8); Bressman & Thompson, 
supra note 87, at 610–11. Presidents sometimes appoint cabinet secretaries from other 
political parties, but this is the exception, not the rule, and is done at the president’s 
discretion. Bressman & Thompson, supra note 87, at 610–11.  
 96 The federal budget process culminates in the annual President’s Budget, a 
transmission to Congress that informs annual appropriations bills. See generally Eloise 
Pasachoff, The President’s Budget as a Source of Agency Policy Control, 125 YALE L.J. 
2182 (2016). But some agencies have the authority to raise a substantial portion of their 
operating budget through fees and other mechanisms that do not rely on presidential 
budgeting or Congressional appropriations. This can disconnect the agency from presidential 
oversight as well as Congressional appropriations. See Conti-Brown, supra note 74, at 273–
74 (discussing the Federal Reserve’s budgetary independence).  
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funding decisions,97 choices about how and whether to support new legislation 
or proposed statutory reforms and how to communicate views to Congress,98 
and how and whether to litigate.99 The result is various and inconsistently-
 
 97 Some agencies can communicate directly with Congress to negotiate their budgets 
rather than relying on the president’s consolidated budget request. Under current law, 
agencies must coordinate their budget requests through OMB, unless they are carved out. 
OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, OMB CIRCULAR NO. A–
11 § 10.5 (July 2020); see Memorandum from Jim Jukes, Assistant Dir. for Legislative 
Reference, to OMB Policy Officers and DADs 2–6 (Feb. 20, 2001), https://www.citizen.org/ 
sites/default/files/ombdocument1.pdf [https://perma.cc/Z7LT-MM2Z] [hereinafter Jukes 
Memorandum]. An agency might prefer to communicate with Congress about its budgetary 
matters to better influence the outcome by advocating more directly for its preferences 
without consideration of presidential preferences or what other agencies are requesting. See 
Strauss, supra note 68, at 591–92. While this provides flexibility, evidence is not clear that 
this ultimately benefits these agencies. See Datla & Revesz, supra note 75, at 806 n.207 
(citing Kenneth J. Meier, The Impact of Regulatory Organization Structure: IRCs or DRAs?, 
3 S. REV. PUB. ADMIN. 427, 438 (1980) and Christopher G. Reddick, IRCs Versus DRAs: 
Budgetary Support for Economic and Social Regulation, 23 PUB. BUDGETING & FIN. 21, 47–
48 (2003) for the proposition that agencies with budget bypass secure lower funding 
increases than other agencies coordinated by the president’s budget process). 
 98 Most agencies are expected to coordinate legislative communications through OMB, 
but some can communicate directly with Congress about legislative business. See generally 
OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, OMB CIRCULAR NO. A–19 
(Sept. 1979). As Richard Neustadt noted: “Here is presidential machinery to coordinate a 
vital aspect of executive policy development; machinery to control, in some degree at least, 
the means by which the diverse elements of the executive express and implement their own 
designs.” Richard E. Neustadt, Presidency and Legislation: The Growth of Central 
Clearance, 48 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 641, 642 (1954). This system of review and clearance has 
been part of OMB since the 1920s. Id. OMB keeps a “tight reign” on the process. David E. 
Lewis, The Adverse Consequences of the Politics of Agency Design for Presidential 
Management in the United States: The Relative Durability of Insulated Agencies, 34 BRIT. 
J. POL. SCI. 377, 389 (2004). Bypassing this program can be valuable to an agency because 
it allows pursuit of the agency’s own agenda, without first coordinating with the rest of the 
executive branch and perhaps compromising on its views. OMB maintains a list of 
exceptions. See generally Jukes Memorandum, supra note 97. It explains:  
These legislative bypass provisions undermine the President’s role as Chief Executive 
and can deprive the President, Executive agencies, and Congress of the full benefits of 
OMB’s central clearance process. In particular, OMB’s coordination of legislative 
proposals, testimony, and the like on behalf of the Administration serves several 
important purposes. First, it provides a mechanism for development of a coherent 
legislative program for the President. Second, it encourages the various agencies to take 
the concerns and views of other agencies into account. Third, it facilitates the 
development of a consistent Administration position on legislation. Finally, it assures 
that Congress gets coordinated and informative agency views on legislation under 
consideration. 
Id. at 2. 
 99 Some agencies can represent themselves in court, while others must rely on the 
Department of Justice to be their advocates. Neal Devins & Michael Herz, The Uneasy Case 
for Department of Justice Control of Federal Litigation, 5 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 558, 559–61 
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distributed authorities that allow some agencies to make their own choices in 
certain areas but not others. In each case, from the standpoint of institutional 
design and incentives facing the agencies, the benefits of individual agency 
flexibility trade off against the benefits of coordinated action across the 
executive branch, among other considerations.  
The uneven distribution of removal protections, other structural features, 
and decision-making authorities sits in opposition to the conventional 
understanding that certain agencies are independent and others are not.100 
Instead, a “fluid and slippery thing,”101 independence is not a single quality that 
an agency either does or does not durably possess.102 The binary view that an 
 
(2003). See generally Margaret H. Lemos, The Solicitor General as Mediator Between Court 
and Agency, 2009 MICH. ST. L. REV. 185; Susan M. Olson, Challenges to the Gatekeeper: 
The Debate Over Federal Litigating Authority, 68 JUDICATURE 71 (1984); Bijal Shah, 
Executive (Agency) Administration, 72 STAN. L. REV. 641 (2020). Congress has enacted 
many exceptions, most of which are limited in some way to particular actions or venues. 
Datla & Revesz, supra note 75, at 799–804; Neal Devins & Michael Herz, The Battle That 
Never Was: Congress, the White House, and Agency Litigation Authority, 61 L. & CONTEMP. 
PROBS. 205, 208 (1998). 
  Litigation bypass gives an agency the ability to choose which cases to initiate or 
appeal, as well as which arguments to make in enforcement or defensive litigation. See Neal 
Devins, Unitariness and Independence: Solicitor General Control over Independent Agency 
Litigation, 82 CALIF. L. REV. 255, 256 (1994) [hereinafter Devins, Unitariness and 
Independence]; Alan B. Morrison, How Independent Are Independent Regulatory 
Agencies?, 1988 DUKE L.J. 252, 254–55 (discussing DOJ litigation review for independent 
agencies). One example of the significance of this bypass is that it sidesteps appellate review 
from the Solicitor General’s office, which bears the burden of coordinating positions taken 
by the U.S. government before the Supreme Court. See Devins, Unitariness and 
Independence, supra, at 256. Factors unrelated to an agency might inform the Solicitor 
General’s preferences on that agency’s litigation strategy, because of the desire to present a 
unified position. See Datla & Revesz, supra note 75, at 802. The choice to pursue or forgo 
an appeal can influence or even bind future decision-making. See id. One example is the 
decision of whether to appeal a court’s decision after a loss. Absent an appeal, the agency 
might reasonably be concerned that it is in a weaker position on future, similar issues. See 
id. There is also emerging study of intra-executive branch litigation, i.e., agencies suing each 
other, suggesting that one agency’s ability to initiate its own suits against another agency is 
valuable. See generally Shah, supra. 
 100 See Vermeule, supra note 89, at 1165–66; see also Datla & Revesz, supra note 75, 
at 772; Selin, supra note 83, at 972–73. Those seeking a clean line between these two 
categories in the modern administrative state have not found it. See BREGER & EDLES, supra 
note 70, at 4 (“Our definition of ‘independent’ is somewhat arbitrary, but the lack of both 
doctrinal cohesion and comprehensive information makes the task of definition difficult.”); 
LEWIS & SELIN, SOURCEBOOK, supra note 82, at 48–65. 
 101 Devins, supra note 88, at 312. 
 102 See Bressman & Thompson, supra note 87, at 600–01 (describing mechanisms for 
“presidential involvement short of plenary control” and challenging the “binary division” 
between independent and executive agencies); see also Datla & Revesz, supra note 75, at 
772; Morrison, supra note 99, at 256 (stating that some independent agencies “are neither as 
dependent nor as independent as they sometimes seem, and the situation seems likely to 
continue that way for some time”). Agencies that are understood to be “independent” do not 
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agency is either independent or not independent is what Anne Joseph O’Connell 
has called a “cramped view of the administrative state.”103 A binary distinction 
papers over the statutory variation of agencies and the “body of observed 
practices and norms that constitute the landscape of agency independence.”104 
Once the binary is peeled away, what emerges is a sort of manifest independence 
for each agency.105 Datla and Revesz have argued that agency independence 
exists along a continuum, with some agencies possessing greater claim to 
independence than others.106 They include, on this continuum, agencies 
generally described as “executive” agencies, demonstrating that even those 
agencies can have certain features that insulate them from presidential 
control.107  
A second set of scholarly insights shows that there is a temporal dimension 
as well. Selin and Lewis show that agency independence changes over time, 
particularly in the ways that agency decision making gains insulation from 
political review over time.108 O’Connell’s work gives the frame of centrifugal 
and centripetal movement away from—or towards—the president’s political 
control.109 Focusing on the Federal Reserve, Peter Conti-Brown documents the 
 
even necessarily have that term in their enabling statutes. E.g., 15 U.S.C. § 41 (2012) 
(enabling act for the Federal Trade Commission). 
 103 Anne Joseph O’Connell, Bureaucracy at the Boundary, 162 U. PA. L. REV. 841, 922 
(2014). In this article, O’Connell considers vertical dimensions of political control, “between 
federal and state actors or federal and foreign players, as well as on other dimensions that 
drive agency structure.” Id.  
 104 See Vermeule, supra note 89, at 1174. 
 105 See LEWIS & SELIN, SOURCEBOOK, supra note 82, at 49 n.133 (“Most existing 
scholarship recognizes some clustering of design characteristics that together signify 
independence . . . .”). 
 106 Datla & Revesz, supra note 75, at 772–73; accord Lewis & Selin, Political Control, 
supra note 82, at 1504–05 (“Because so many features affect responsiveness, agency 
independence should be thought of as a scale, ranging from less to more insulated from 
political influence. Most independent agencies have many structural features that insulate 
them from political control and are located on one end of this scale.”). 
 107 Datla & Revesz, supra note 75, at 826. Additional painstaking, empirical work from 
the political science literature bears this out. In 2015, Jennifer Selin published her analysis 
of 321 federal agencies, examining fifty different features in an effort to estimate 
independence. Selin, supra note 83, at 976. Selin’s work provides methodological rigor to 
the realization that agency independence is far more complex than the question of for-cause 
removal, and that control over agency policymaking processes can be just as important as 
the features that determine who leads the agency. Id. at 972. Selin estimated “structural 
independence” across two dimensions: independence of decision makers and independence 
of policy decisions. Id. The former includes elements like for-cause removal and term length 
requirements. Id. The latter includes elements like whether agencies can communicate with 
Congress without prior review from others in the executive branch. Id. Her work shows the 
agencies mapped on these two dimensions, revealing, for example, that the Federal Reserve 
Board of Governors exhibits the most independence while Cabinet agencies have the least 
independence. Id. at 980. 
 108 Lewis & Selin, Political Control, supra note 82, at 1512. 
 109 O’Connell, supra note 103, at 871–74. 
692 OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 81:4 
rise of its independence over time.110 Conti-Brown argues that the Fed’s 
increased independence is only partly due to statutory grants of 
independence.111 Instead, he explains that “the laws of Federal Reserve 
independence demonstrate the iterative, interactive conversation between 
formal law, modern practice, and historical change.”112 Such dynamism defies 
formalist, binary approaches to understanding agency independence. 
Neil Devins’ theory of political will helps explain how an agency might 
manage to assert independence in an area that was not expressly granted to it by 
Congress, and how a president might erode an agency’s independence. He 
explains that “[s]tructural limitations are significant, but not controlling. The 
willfulness of the President, the Congress, and the agency itself are equally 
important.”113 He uses the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission 
(EEOC) as an example of political dynamism that can diminish an agency’s 
independence, showing that Justice Department control over EEOC litigation, 
followed by Congressional acquiescence, brought the EEOC to heel.114 In the 
other direction, he documents the increasing independence of the FCC due to 
“[c]ongressional and agency assertions of power.”115 
Devins’ theory offers a frame through which to consider individual 
developments such as the FTC’s attempt to break away from the president’s 
budget process,116 or the various assertions of agencies that they need not 
comply with OMB’s legislative review program,117 and so on. These are merely 
efforts to break away from executive control. The reciprocal notion that the 
president seeks to maximize control in all instances might also be oversold.118 
The president might abide agency assertions of control if the president is able to 
get what he or she wants through other forms of presidential influence, such as 
the power to appoint members, select the agency’s chair, use the ability to 
 
 110 See generally Peter Conti-Brown, supra note 74. 
 111 Id. at 259–60. 
 112 Id. at 261. 
 113 Devins, supra note 88, at 274. 
 114 Id. at 273, 285–98. 
 115 Id. at 274–75, 298–306. 
 116 Datla & Revesz, supra note 75, at 780.  
 117 OMB Circular A–19 defines an “agency” broadly as “[a]ny executive department 
or independent commission, board, bureau, office, agency, Government-owned or controlled 
corporation, or other establishment of the Government, including any regulatory commission 
or board and also the municipal government of the District of Columbia.” OFFICE OF MGMT. 
& BUDGET, EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, OMB CIRCULAR NO. A–19 § 5(b) (Sept. 1979). 
Under this definition, independent agencies are included. It does include a carve-out for 
“those agencies that are specifically required by law to transmit their legislative proposals, 
reports, or testimony to the Congress without prior clearance.” Id. § 4. It goes on to note, 
though, that OMB will “honor requests from such agencies for advice on the relationship of 
particular legislation, reports, or testimony to the program of the President.” Id. 
 118 Bressman & Thomson, supra note 87, at 601 (“[T]he President does not always have 
a political interest in seeking maximum control of regulatory policy.”). 
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remove for cause when appropriate, and other, informal techniques such as 
“jawboning” to influence decision-making at the agency.119  
This scholarship is helpful to explain why independence fails to be an all-
or-nothing designation, and why it may shift over time. Most importantly for 
this article, it is clear that insulating features are neither uniformly distributed 
across independent agencies nor entirely withheld from non-independent 
agencies, and that this can change over time as political will waxes and wanes. 
The “natural conclusion” of this revelation “is that independence is unstable as 
a legal category.”120 Datla and Revesz explain that a “constitutional force field” 
generally surrounds independent agencies, but that this is flawed reasoning 
arising from the binary view of agency independence.121 They argue that “the 
diversity of agency form should affect the way we think about agencies” and 
that “[t]here is no reason to believe that Congress means for agencies to have 
special constitutional protection from presidential control when it chooses not 
to grant those same agencies full or uniform statutory protection against such 
control.”122  
The consequences of categorical distinctions despite extant ambiguity 
include errors of over- or under-inclusion, or in the case of agency 
independence, over- or under-insulation. Policies that grant independent 
agencies special immunity can erroneously overextend political insulation. The 
error can flow the other direction, too, with inadequate deference from the 
president. Both errors are borne of the same mistaken understanding of the true 
nature of agency independence.  
B. Independent Regulatory Agencies and Their Unique Disadvantage 
The remainder of this article will focus on a subset of independent agencies 
called the “independent regulatory agencies.” This is the set of agencies that are 
exempt from the regulatory review conducted by the OIRA under Executive 
Order (EO) 12,866.123 Given the rise of judicial review of regulatory analysis, 
the independent regulatory agencies are uniquely disadvantaged upon judicial 
review. 
Most federal agencies are subject to EO 12,866, the order that has governed 
regulatory review since 1993.124 It directs agencies to conduct certain analyses 
 
 119 See generally Verkuil, supra note 90. Verkuil describes “jawboning” as the 
phenomenon when “the President may have the power to act directly, but he prefers for 
political reasons to cajole, persuade, or arbitrate.” Id. at 943. 
 120 Vermeule, supra note 89, at 1181 n.83 (arguing also that independence might be 
“best understood as a conventional rather than legal attribute”). 
 121 Datla & Revesz, supra note 75, at 773. 
 122 Id. at 773–74. 
 123 Exec. Order No. 12,866, 58 Fed. Reg. 51,735 (Sept. 30, 1993). 
 124 Id. 
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of their proposed regulatory changes and to submit those materials to OIRA for 
review prior to publication.125  
The literature on OIRA review is vast and the office has been controversial 
since it was created. OIRA is the poster-child of what then-Professor Elena 
Kagan termed “presidential administration,” an instrument for the president to 
influence agency regulatory processes.126 As such, OIRA—”a mixture of 
expertise and politics”127—has been a lightning rod in the debate over the proper 
role of the president in policymaking, the limits and promise of analytical 
techniques used to assess proposed rule changes, and the expanding bureaucracy 
itself.128 Despite these controversies, the office has endured; a sign of its 
usefulness to presidents of both parties.  
As many have described, OIRA review serves multiple functions, including 
technical assessment against OMB standards for regulatory analysis (e.g., cost-
benefit analysis), interagency coordination across the executive branch, and 
political review. First, the standards for regulatory analysis are meant to infuse 
agency decision-making with analytic rigor. EO 12,866 contains a “regulatory 
philosophy” that  
Federal agencies should promulgate only such regulations as are required by 
law, are necessary to interpret the law, or are made necessary by compelling 
public need, such as material failures of private markets to protect or improve 
the health and safety of the public, the environment, or the well-being of the 
American people. In deciding whether and how to regulate, agencies should 
assess all costs and benefits of available regulatory alternatives, including the 
alternative of not regulating. Costs and benefits shall be understood to include 
both quantifiable measures (to the fullest extent that these can be usefully 
estimated) and qualitative measures of costs and benefits that are difficult to 
quantify, but nevertheless essential to consider. Further, in choosing among 
alternative regulatory approaches, agencies should select those approaches that 
maximize net benefits (including potential economic, environmental, public 
health and safety, and other advantages; distributive impacts; and equity), 
unless a statute requires another regulatory approach.129 
 
 125 Id. Exactly what happens during OIRA review is the subject of much curiosity, 
speculation, and concern. See, e.g., Lisa Heinzerling, Statutory Interpretation in the Era of 
OIRA, 33 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1097, 1097 (2006). Former OIRA insiders have tried to shine 
a light on the office, but there is more work to be done. See, e.g., Stuart Shapiro, OIRA Inside 
and Out, 63 ADMIN. L. REV. 135, 136 (2011); Cass R. Sunstein, Commentary, The Office of 
Information and Regulatory Affairs: Myths and Realities, 126 HARV. L. REV. 1838, 1838 
(2013). 
 126 Kagan, supra note 3, at 2246. 
 127 Susan Rose-Ackerman, Putting Cost-Benefit Analysis in Its Place: Rethinking 
Regulatory Review, 65 U. MIAMI L. REV. 335, 340 (2011). 
 128 See Carrigan, Ellig, & Xie, supra note 4, at 12 (discussing impact analysis 
requirements). See generally CALABRESI & YOO, supra note 75 (discussing the debate over 
the president’s role in policymaking).  
 129 Exec. Order No. 12,866, § 1(a), 58 Fed. Reg. 51,735 (Sept. 30, 1993).  
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OIRA’s technical review evaluates the extent to which the draft agency 
action follows this philosophy. On these topics, OIRA possesses institutional 
expertise and its review functions as “institutional peer review.”130 It draws on 
a small, but interdisciplinary, team of economists, scientists, attorneys, 
engineers, and other professionals with a wide variety of expertise.131 
Second, OIRA “helps to oversee a genuinely interagency process, involving 
many specialists throughout the federal government.”132 Sunstein explains that 
“OIRA’s goal is often to identify and convey interagency views and to seek a 
reasonable consensus, not to press its own positions. While OIRA’s own views 
may well matter, OIRA frequently operates as a conveyer and a convener.”133 
Although there are many formal and informal relationships between 
agencies,134 OIRA review serves as an opportunity for a comprehensive 
exchange of views on agency proposals prior to their public release. Given the 
number of areas of overlapping jurisdiction across agencies, this generally 
understudied coordination function heads off inconsistencies and otherwise 
enables the executive branch to communicate its regulatory positions with one 
voice. 
Third, the merits to the President of political review in rulemaking should 
be clear.135 The merits of this to the individual agencies may reasonably vary, 
based on whether presidential oversight leads to consistent or divergent 
outcomes with what the agency would choose without such oversight.136  
Not all agencies are subject to OIRA review. The “independent regulatory 
agencies” are exempt under EO 12,866.137 The exemption cross-references a 
statutory definition in the Paperwork Reduction Act: 
[T]he term “independent regulatory agency” means the Board of Governors of 
the Federal Reserve System, the Commodity Futures Trading Commission, the 
Consumer Product Safety Commission, the Federal Communications 
Commission, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, the Federal Energy 
Regulatory Commission, the Federal Housing Finance Agency, the Federal 
Maritime Commission, the Federal Trade Commission, the Interstate 
Commerce Commission, the Mine Enforcement Safety and Health Review 
Commission, the National Labor Relations Board, the Nuclear Regulatory 
Commission, the Occupational Safety and Health Review Commission, the 
 
 130 Cary Coglianese, Improving Regulatory Analysis at Independent Agencies, 67 AM. 
U. L. REV. 733, 750 (2018). 
 131 See, e.g., Sunstein, supra note 125, at 1856. 
 132 Id. at 1841. 
 133 Id.  
 134 See generally, e.g., Daniel A. Farber & Anne Joseph O’Connell, Agencies as 
Adversaries, 105 CALIF. L. REV. 1375 (2017). 
 135 See Ryan Bubb & Patrick Warren, Optimal Agency Bias and Regulatory Review, 43 
J. LEGAL STUD. 95, 123–32 (2014) (explaining the value of conflict within the executive 
branch). See generally Kagan, supra note 3. 
 136 Kagan, supra note 3, at 2297–98. 
 137 Exec. Order No. 12,866, § 3(b), 58 Fed. Reg. 51,735 (Sept. 30, 1993).  
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Postal Regulatory Commission, the Securities and Exchange Commission, the 
Bureau of Consumer Financial Protection, the Office of Financial Research, 
Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, and any other similar agency 
designated by statute as a Federal independent regulatory agency or 
commission.138  
This definition does not set out criteria to qualify as an independent 
regulatory agency; rather it is mostly a list of specific agencies. The catch-all at 
the end sweeps in other agencies so-designated by Congress, rather than 
providing a functional test.139 This definition is frequently cross-referenced in 
presidential executive orders to exempt independent regulatory agencies from 
various requirements and policies.140  
But as noted above, upon judicial review, independent regulatory agencies 
are obliged to justify their regulatory choices in the same manner as other 
agencies, subject to statutory variation. Independent agencies surely put their 
regulatory proposals through internal agency vetting,141 which often includes 
economists in various configurations,142 and perhaps confer with other 
agencies.143 These important aspects of an agency’s regulatory development 
program cannot be understood to be substitutes for OIRA’s interagency review, 
though, which functions as “institutional peer review.”144 Given the rise of 
judicial review of agency regulatory analysis, independent agencies, cut off 
from OIRA review, are at an elevated risk or remand or vacation upon judicial 
review compared to their OIRA-reviewed counterparts. 
While the independent regulatory agencies sometimes provide information 
about potential effects of their draft rules in their regulatory preambles, it is, as 
a general matter, scant.145 It is not surprising that independent agencies have not 
 
 138 44 U.S.C. § 3502(5) (2012).  
 139 The Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, for example, was added to this list in 
its enabling statute. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. 
No. 111–203, § 1011(a), 124 Stat. 1376, 1964 (2010). 
 140 See, e.g., Exec. Order No. 13,771, § 4(c), 82 Fed. Reg. 9339 (Jan. 30, 2017); Exec. 
Order No. 12,866, § 3(b), 58 Fed. Reg. 51,735 (Sept. 30, 1993). 
 141 See Jennifer Nou, Intra-Agency Coordination, 129 HARV. L. REV. 421, 468–71 
(2015). 
 142 See generally JERRY ELLIG, AGENCY ECONOMISTS (Sept. 2019), 
https://www.acus.gov/sites/default/files/documents/Ellig%20Agency%20Economists%20F
inal%20Report%20September%202019.pdf [https://perma.cc/U3DX-PATY] (discussing 
“divisional,” “functional,” and hybrid methods for organizing agency economists). 
 143 See Jody Freeman & Jim Rossi, Agency Coordination in Shared Regulatory Space, 
125 HARV. L. REV. 1131, 1155–73 (2012). 
 144 Coglianese, supra note 130, at 750. 
 145 In an annual report on agency rulemaking, OIRA found that only a portion 
independent agency rules contained even “some information about costs and benefits.” 
OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, 2017 REPORT TO CONGRESS 
ON THE BENEFITS AND COSTS OF FEDERAL REGULATIONS AND AGENCY COMPLIANCE WITH 
THE UNFUNDED MANDATES REFORM ACT 103–05 (2017), https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-
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been separately choosing to undertake the kind of analysis that OIRA and courts 
have in mind. First, they are exempt from the requirements to which other 
agencies are subject.146 Where these agencies are not required to conduct these 
analyses, they largely do not.147 Second, investing in the capacity to conduct 
this type of analysis, from personnel to data inputs, would involve directing an 
agency’s limited resources away from other activities.148 Third, the direct cost 
of suboptimal regulatory decisions (i.e., those that are not informed by 
regulatory analysis required by EO 12,866) is generally not borne by the agency, 
and it might take years for even indirect costs to visit themselves upon the 
agency.149 While there is some evidence that independent regulatory agencies 
are doing more than generally acknowledged, it is still not a high level of 
analytical output.150 As such, there’s a “consensus about independent agencies’ 
analytical deficiencies.”151 
Describing the “shortcomings” of analytical work done at independent 
regulatory agencies, Revesz explained that the Nuclear Regulatory Commission 
 
content/uploads/2019/12/2019-CATS-5885-REV_DOC-2017Cost_BenefitReport11_18_ 
2019.docx.pdf [https://perma.cc/GML5-BE4F]. Another OMB report notes:  
Independent agencies still have challenges in providing monetized estimates of benefits 
and costs of regulation . . . . [F]or the purposes of informing the public and obtaining a 
full accounting, it would be highly desirable to obtain better information on the benefits 
and costs of the rules issued by independent regulatory agencies. The absence of such 
information is a continued obstacle to transparency, and it might also have adverse 
effects on public policy. 
OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, 2015 REPORT TO CONGRESS 
ON THE BENEFITS AND COSTS OF REGULATION AND AGENCY COMPLIANCE WITH THE 
UNFUNDED MANDATES REFORM ACT 27–32 (2015), https://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/white 
house.gov/files/omb/inforeg/inforeg/2015_cb/2015-cost-benefit-report.pdf [https://perma.cc/ 
6CAW-SP9K]. 
 146 CURTIS W. COPELAND, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS AND INDEPENDENT REGULATORY 
AGENCIES 31, 104 (Apr. 2013), https://www.acus.gov/sites/default/files/documents/Copelan 
d%20Final%20BCA%20Report%204-30-13.pdf [https://perma.cc/UNZ7-K2SG] (“Several 
crosscutting analytical requirements are already potentially applicable to rules issued by 
independent regulatory agencies. Also, some of the statutes that provide independent 
regulatory agencies with rulemaking authority contain certain provisions that may require 
some type of regulatory analysis. Most independent regulatory agencies, however, are not 
explicitly required to prepare cost-benefit analyses before issuing their rules. . . . FCC 
officials indicated that one reason the agency did not prepare cost-benefit analyses more 
frequently in the past was the absence of a statutory requirement to do so.”); Coglianese, 
supra note 130, at 741–42. 
 147 Coglianese, supra note 130, at 742–44.  
 148 See, e.g., id. at 752. 
 149 See Ryan Bubb, Comment: The OIRA Model for Institutionalizing CBA of Financial 
Regulation, 78 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 47, 50 (2015) (explaining that “institutional structures 
do not produce incentives for financial regulators” to undertake this form of regulatory 
analysis). 
 150 Coglianese, supra note 130, at 743. 
 151 Id. 
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(NRC) invested tremendous resources into a determination of the value of a 
statistical life, a valuation that serves as an input into cost-benefit analysis.152 
The NRC was “isolated from methodological advances” available to other 
agencies in the executive branch.153 The result was a wasteful process to arrive 
at the same result as the rest of the executive branch.154  
Some independent regulatory agencies are beginning to try different 
approaches to meet the increasing demands of judicial review.155 After all, no 
agency wants to expend resources on promulgating a rule just to have it 
remanded by a court. For example, following Business Roundtable, the SEC 
implemented several reforms designed to improve its regulatory analysis, 
including an internal reorganization that strengthened the role of the chief 
economist, preparation of internal guidance on economic analysis, and the 
addition of dozens of economists.156 These “notable strides” have improved 
SEC’s regulatory analysis.157 It has taken years, though, to essentially duplicate 
OMB’s existing guidance on regulatory impact analysis.158 And the separate 
group of SEC economists develops its own approaches to analytical problems, 
away from OIRA and with no obvious mechanism to coordinate with it.159 SEC 
also lacks access to the formalized interagency review that OIRA 
coordinates.160 
In addition, the FCC recently reorganized its economists in an effort to use 
their skills “optimally” for commission work, including its regulatory actions.161 
These agencies might have been able to streamline their efforts if they had 
access to OIRA in a manner that did not imperil their independence. Under the 
current language of EO 12,866, independent regulatory agencies are excluded 
from OIRA review.162 There is evidence that agencies that undergo OIRA 
review are better at the kind of regulatory analysis that courts increasingly 
 
 152 See Revesz, supra note 4, at 561–63. 
 153 Id. at 562. 
 154 See id. at 564–65. 
 155 See Coglianese, supra note 130, at 745 (“Due to the demands that courts have started 
to impose on independent regulatory agencies, as well as the generally heightened salience 
of the issue of regulatory analysis at independent agencies (including the prospect of 
legislative change), independent regulators appear already to be taking some steps to 
improve their institutional capacity for producing quality analysis.”) (footnote omitted); Lee, 
supra note 42, at 885 (discussing additional scrutiny for independent agencies after Business 
Roundtable). 
 156 Ellig, supra note 65, at 5–6.  
 157 Coglianese, supra note 130, at 745. 
 158 See Revesz, supra note 4, at 565–70. 
 159 See Coglianese, supra note 130, at 745. 
 160 See id. at 746. 
 161 Ajit Pai, Chairman, FCC, The Importance of Economic Analysis at the FCC 2, 5 
(Apr. 5, 2017), https://docs.fcc.gov/public/attachments/DOC-344248A1.pdf (on file with the 
Ohio State Law Journal). 
 162 See Exec. Order No. 12,866, § 3(b), 58 Fed. Reg. 51,735 (Sept. 30, 1993).  
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scrutinize.163 This article does not attempt to suggest that agencies subject to 
OIRA review produce perfect analyses, but that the OIRA review process has a 
salutary effect on agency analysis and therefore regulatory decision-making.164 
As will be explained below, it is likely that the decision to wall off 
independent regulatory agencies from OIRA review was done out of political, 
rather than legal, concern. It also, though, walled these agencies off from both 
OIRA’s technical expertise and the formal interagency network of practitioners 
working on similar issues at their respective agencies. Now that the stakes for 
regulatory analysis are higher, the time is right to address the unintended 
consequences of the independent regulatory agencies’ exemption from OIRA 
review. 
IV. FAILED EFFORTS TO CHANGE THE STATUS QUO 
Pressure from judicial review creates a new incentive to revisit a decision 
from 1981 that cemented the relationship between OIRA and the independent 
regulatory agencies. Over the years, scholars and practitioners have called for 
OIRA’s review of independent regulatory agencies, but the details of how that 
review would function in practice are not often discussed. Rather, the emphasis 
has largely been confined to describing perceived shortcomings of the status 
quo. Congress could certainly resolve the issues by legislating, but it has not 
successfully done so. This section considers the 1981 decision and subsequent 
calls for change. 
 
 163 See Jerry Ellig & Hester Peirce, SEC Regulatory Analysis: “A Long Way to Go and 
a Short Time to Get There”, 8 BROOK. J. CORP. FIN. & COM. L. 361, 381 (2014); Arthur Fraas 
& Randall Lutter, On the Economic Analysis of Regulations at Independent Regulatory 
Commissions, 63 ADMIN. L. REV. 213, 236 (2011) (“[T]his review suggests that the 
economic analyses prepared by independent regulatory commissions do not measure up to 
those of the executive branch agencies.”); Hester Peirce, Economic Analysis by Federal 
Financial Regulators, 9 J.L., ECON. & POL’Y 569, 585 (2013); Jerry Ellig & Rosemarie Fike, 
Regulatory Process, Regulatory Reform, and the Quality of Regulatory Impact Analysis 44–
45 (Mercatus Ctr., George Mason Univ., Working Paper No. 13-13, 2013), https://www.mer 
catus.org/system/files/Ellig_RegulatoryProcess_v1.pdf [https://perma.cc/5UUZ-CZPP]. 
Revesz also cites recent empirical work to demonstrate that the independent agencies 
excluded from OIRA review are “less successful” at cost-benefit analysis of draft 
regulations. Revesz, supra note 4, at 560 (citing Howell E. Jackson & Paul Rothstein, The 
Analysis of Benefits in Consumer Protection Regulations (Dec. 2015) (unpublished 
manuscript), https://www.law.ox.ac.uk/sites/files/oxlaw/jackson_and_roths tein_article-
_december_2015.pdf [https://perma.cc/8TQB-S9VF]). The work can now be found at 
Howell E. Jackson & Paul Rothstein, The Analysis of Benefits in Consumer Protection 
Regulations, 9 HARV. BUS. L. REV. 197 (2019).  
 164 See, e.g., Kagan, supra note 3, at 2340 (“The practice of OMB review over the last 
twenty years in fact has enhanced . . . the capacity of the administrative system . . . .”); see 
also Robert W. Hahn & Patrick M. Dudley, How Well Does the U.S. Government Do Benefit-
Cost Analysis?, 1 REV. ENVTL. ECON. & POL’Y 192, 195–96 (2007) (examining the quality 
of agency regulatory analysis). 
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A. History of the Exemption from OIRA Review  
The history of independent regulatory agencies’ exemption from OIRA 
review goes back to EO 12,291, which established regulatory review in the 
Reagan administration.165 Two versions of this EO were drafted: one included 
independent regulatory agencies, and one did not.166 Both were sent to the 
Office of Legal Counsel (OLC) at the Department of Justice, which opined that 
both drafts were lawful.167 Demonstrating how close President Reagan came to 
applying regulatory oversight to the independent regulatory agencies, OLC’s 
legal opinions were offered just days before EO 12,291 was signed.168 
There was a bevy of political and legal questions at the time.169 C. Boyden 
Gray testified before Congress on the subject:  
The EO, by its terms, does not cover the independent agencies. This is not so 
much that we thought we lacked certain legal authority to do certain things, 
since I think we could have extended the EO and might still in the future. We 
chose not to do it really because of policy reasons . . . [W]e had our plate more 
than full with the Executive Branch Agencies which do impose[,] by far[,] the 
greatest percentage of capital cost[] burdens that we think were issued during 
the campaign. We just didn’t want to spread ourselves too thin. If we can get 
the main regulatory problems under control, we’ll actually focus at that point 
more on the independents, but we’ll wait and see how much progress we make 
with the Executive Branch.170 
Katzen described the decision not to include the independent agencies in 
EO 12,291, and then again in EO 12,866 as “essentially for political reasons—
namely, deference to Congress, which traditionally views the [independent 
regulatory commissions] as ‘its’ agencies, not the President’s.”171 Neither, 
 
 165 Exec. Order No. 12,291, § 1(d), 3 C.F.R. § 127 (Feb. 17, 1981).  
 166 See Memorandum from Larry L. Simms, Acting Assistant Attorney Gen., Office of 
Legal Counsel, Dep’t of Justice, to David Stockman, Dir., Office of Mgmt. and Budget 7 
(Feb. 12, 1981) (describing analysis of a version of the EO that included independent 
agencies under its purview), reprinted in Role of OMB in Regulation: Hearing Before the 
Subcomm. on Oversight and Investigations of the H. Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 97th 
Cong. 152, 158 (1981) [hereinafter Simms Memorandum]. 
 167 Id. at 163.  
 168 Id. at 152. 
 169 Although they did not appear to factor into the analysis, there would also have been 
practical considerations, such as those described infra at text accompanying notes 214–15. 
 170 Hall of Flags Regulation Reform: Briefing Before the Subcomm. on Oversight & 
Investigations of the H. Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 97th Cong. 24 (1980) (statement 
of C. Boyden Gray, Counsel to the Vice President), reprinted in Role of OMB in Regulation: 
Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Oversight and Investigations of the H. Comm. on Energy 
and Commerce, 97th Cong. 87, 94 (1981). 
 171 Sally Katzen, OIRA at Thirty: Reflections and Recommendations, 63 ADMIN. L. 
REV. 103, 109 (2011). 
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notably, signaled that they were legally unable to extend the executive orders to 
independent agencies. 
But there were legal questions, generally centered on the uncertainty of 
limitations on the President’s authority to supervise the independent regulatory 
agencies.172 The February 12, 1981 OLC memorandum responds to the draft 
EO that included the independent regulatory agencies.173 It deals, at length, with 
the legal and political considerations associated with this proposed action.174 
The memo considers whether the President can impose both procedural 
requirements, such as the preparation of regulatory impact analyses, as well as 
his or her substantive policy views upon the heads of independent regulatory 
agencies.175 The memo concludes that efforts to do either are in tension with 
dicta from Humphrey’s Executor v. U.S.176 “endorsing a perceived 
congressional purpose to insulate [independent agencies] almost entirely from 
Presidential supervision.”177 Taking this dicta “at face value, the President’s 
constitutional power to supervise the independent agencies is limited to his 
power of appointment, and none of the proposed Order’s requirements may 
legally be applied to the independent agencies.”178  
The memo then sets out several reasons why the Court “would . . . retreat 
from these dicta.”179 The first is that Humphrey’s Executor was a case regarding 
agency adjudication, rather than rulemaking.180 Second, whether an agency is 
independent or not, it “engage[s] in rulemaking in a fundamentally 
indistinguishable fashion.”181 Third, the Court in Humphrey’s Executor was 
relying on “an outmoded view about the ‘apolitical’ nature of regulation,” rather 
than modern understanding that political influence comes to bear on many 
aspects of the rulemaking process.182 Fourth, it noted the various statutory 
powers that Congress has granted the president over independent agencies, such 
as the budgetary and legislative review.183  
 
 172 See, e.g., Lessig & Sunstein, supra note 74, at 112 (noting that executive authority 
over independent agencies was unclear); Peter M. Shane, Independent Policymaking and 
Presidential Power: A Constitutional Analysis, 57 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 596, 611 (1989) 
(finding narrow and broad textual support for agency independence); Strauss, supra note 68, 
at 596. 
 173 Simms Memorandum, supra note 166, at 152. 
 174 Id. at 153–64. 
 175 Id. at 154–58. 
176 295 U.S. 602, 624 (1935).  
 177 Simms Memorandum, supra note 166, at 158–64. 
 178 Id. at 160. 
 179 Id. 
 180 Id. at 160. 
 181 Id. at 160–61. 
 182 Id. at 161. See generally Andreas Eriksen, Political Values in Independent Agencies, 
REG. & GOVERNANCE (forthcoming) (on file with the Ohio State Law Journal) (describing 
the inevitability of political judgments being made by independent agencies).  
 183 Simms Memorandum, supra note 166, at 161–62. 
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Ultimately, OLC concluded that the president may require all agencies to 
prepare a regulatory impact analysis184 under his or her Article II authorities to 
“take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed”185 and to “require the Opinion, 
in writing, of the principal Officer in each of the executive Departments, upon 
any Subject relating to the Duties of their respective Offices.”186 It emphasized 
caution on any provisions that would result in “Presidential supervision on 
matters of substantive policy.”187 The memo distinguished this from provisions 
that “consist[] of a coordinating role with only an indirect effect on substantive 
policymaking.”188 OLC’s opinion was that the draft provisions navigated this 
tension adequately, and that the extension to independent regulatory agencies 
would be lawful.189 
The second OLC memo, dated February 13, 1981, does not discuss the draft 
executive order’s application to independent regulatory agencies, reflecting the 
executive order that was signed by President Reagan the following week on 
February 17, 1981.190 That order, EO 12,291, locked in the policy that excludes 
independent regulatory agencies from OIRA review to this day.191 
The unintended consequence of that choice is that there is one set of 
regulations that has long been subject to the analytical requirements of EO 
12,866, and another that has not. While cellphones, children’s products, clothing 
labels, and nuclear power plants are exempt,192 pharmaceuticals, passenger cars, 
endangered species, and occupational safety are covered.193 Depending on your 
 
 184 Id. at 153–56. 
 185 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3. 
 186 Id. § 2. 
 187 Simms Memorandum, supra note 166, at 161. 
 188 Id. at 163. 
 189 Id. The American Bar Association and the Administrative Conference of the United 
States have agreed that, as a legal matter, the President may direct the independent regulatory 
agencies to conduct regulatory analysis. Presidential Review of Agency Rulemaking 
(Recommendation 88-9), 54 Fed. Reg. 5207, 5208–09 (Feb. 2, 1989); Letter from Thomas 
M. Susman, Dir., Am. Bar Ass’n Governmental Affairs Office, to Senator Thomas R. Carper 
and Senator Tom A. Coburn, at 2 (Sept. 16, 2013) (on file with the Ohio State Law Journal). 
 190 Memorandum from Larry L. Simms, Acting Assistant Attorney Gen., Office of 
Legal Counsel, Dep’t of Justice, to David Stockman, Dir., Office of Mgmt. and Budget (Feb. 
13, 1981), reprinted in 5 OPINIONS OF THE OFFICE OF LEGAL COUNSEL OF THE UNITED STATES 
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE 59, 61 (Margaret Colgate Love ed., 1981). 
 191 Exec. Order No. 12,291, § 1(d), 3 C.F.R. 128 (Feb. 17, 1981). 
 192 The listed items are regulated by the Federal Communications Commission, the 
Consumer Products Safety Commission, the Federal Trade Commission, and the Nuclear 
Regulatory Commission, respectively. See Other Federal Agencies, PERFORMANCE.GOV, 
https://www.performance.gov/other-federal-agencies/ [https://perma.cc/QPN8-JU6F]. 
 193 These items are regulated by the Departments of Health & Human Services, 
Transportation, Interior, and Labor, respectively. See Department of Health and Human 
Services, PERFORMANCE.GOV, https://www.performance.gov/health-and-human-services/ 
[https://perma.cc/87G9-7XB4]; Department of the Interior, PERFORMANCE.GOV, 
https://www.performance.gov/interior/ [https://perma.cc/HP7Q-8PZ9]; Department of 
Labor, PERFORMANCE.GOV, https://www.performance.gov/labor/ [https://perma.cc/E7VJ-
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view of the role of economic analysis in regulation, this might be frustrating or 
a relief. Either way, it is incoherent, because—even if one supports the idea of 
political insulation for decision-making purposes—there is no meaningful way 
to explain why these different regulatory areas should be analyzed differently. 
In light of deeper understanding of the nature of agency independence, it is 
clear that the definition of “independent regulatory agency” draws a bright line 
at the expense of coherence. As Cary Coglianese has noted, the agencies listed 
in the Paperwork Reduction Act definition “do not uniformly share the same 
structural features. Most have agency heads protected by for-cause removal 
limitations, but some do not . . . [and the] list does not include some agencies 
headed by administrators who do enjoy for-cause removal protection . . . .”194 
When EO 12,291, and EO 12,866 after it, referred to the statutory definition of 
“independent regulatory agency,” it opted for a categorical, as opposed to a 
functional, test for exclusion from regulatory review.  
While the bright line has offered certainty about whether OIRA would 
review these agencies’ regulatory actions, the trade-off is that regulatory review 
has been cut off from these agencies whether their level of independence called 
for it, or not. The result is that the current approach to excluding independent 
regulatory agencies from OIRA review—that is, the statutory list195—cannot be 
assured to offer agencies a level of independence commensurate with that which 
Congress gave them or which has emerged over time. Like a dock that can float 
up and down on the tide, agency independence is not fixed in one position. The 
policy domain has not yet absorbed these scholarly insights. Instead, OIRA 
review of independent regulatory agencies remains fixed to a stale 
understanding of agency independence.  
B. Calls for Change 
Many have called to revisit this exemption from OIRA review. Proposals 
for action by Congress, the courts, or the President have not led to resolution. 
Instead, there is a need for a new idea, one that takes advantage of judicial 
attention towards regulatory analysis and leverages what Kagan has called the 
“dynamic charge” of the executive.196 
Among those who have called for independent regulatory agencies to be 
subject to OIRA review is a group of scholars and practitioners who have spent 
time working in or with OIRA.197 But there is also support from scholars who 
are not OIRA insiders. For example, Datla and Revesz argued:  
 
EUD9]; Department of Transportation, PERFORMANCE.GOV, https://www.performance.gov/ 
transportation/ [https://perma.cc/PQY7-EG27].  
 194 Coglianese, supra note 130, at 739. 
 195 Exec. Order No. 12,291, § 1(d), 3 C.F.R. 128 (Feb. 17, 1981). 
 196 Kagan, supra note 3, at 2339, 2384. 
 197 Robert W. Hahn & Cass R. Sunstein, A New Executive Order for Improving Federal 
Regulation? Deeper and Wider Cost–Benefit Analysis, 150 U. PA. L. REV. 1489, 1494 (2002) 
(“[T]he commitment to cost-benefit analysis has been far too narrow; it should be widened 
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As a policy matter, it also is unsound for the President to keep exempting 
independent agencies from the regulatory review program. These agencies 
have issued and will continue to issue regulations that impose significant costs 
on the economy, just as executive branch agencies do. Not only do so-called 
independent agencies impose great costs on regulated entities, they often do so 
with little analysis of those costs or alternatives during the drafting process. If 
regulatory review is a good practice for agencies traditionally considered to be 
part of the executive branch, as Presidents have recognized for more than three 
decades, it is also a good practice for agencies that have traditionally been 
regarded as independent.198  
Coglianese has also pointed out the arbitrariness of the exemption: “[T]he 
regulations that independent agencies adopt show no meaningful disparity in 
substantive significance that would justify continuing to exempt them entirely 
from analytic requirements. Independent agencies’ regulations are in fact highly 
consequential to the economy and to overall societal well-being.”199 
Proposals for Congress, the courts, or the President to address this issue 
have not been successful. Former OIRA Administrator Sally Katzen proposed 
that Congress enact a version of OIRA review that would permit independent 
regulatory agencies to overrule OIRA in the event of a dispute.200 Cary 
Coglianese has described a similar approach.201 Senator Rob Portman 
introduced a bill in 2012 requiring independent regulatory agencies to prepare 
and submit regulatory analyses to OIRA.202 It did not require those agencies to 
incorporate OIRA’s suggestions, but gave permission to allow OIRA to submit 
its assessment of the rule to the regulatory record and require the agency to 
explain in its final rule if it did not address OIRA’s concerns. A coalition of five 
 
through efforts to incorporate independent regulatory commissions within its reach.”); 
Katzen, supra note 171, at 109 (“I now believe that requirements for economic analysis and 
centralized review should be extended to the Independent Regulatory Commissions. . . . The 
problems that plague our nation do not fit neatly into one agency. Consider the recent 
financial meltdown, which implicated multiple agencies, including both executive branch 
agencies (e.g., Treasury) and IRCs (e.g., Federal Reserve).”); James C. Miller III, The Early 
Days of Reagan Regulatory Relief and Suggestions for OIRA’s Future, 63 ADMIN. L. REV. 
93, 100 (2011); Susan E. Dudley & Sally Katzen, Commissions Are Mulvaney’s Error of 
Omission, WALL ST. J. (Aug. 5, 2018), https://www.wsj.com/articles/commissions-are-
mulvaneys-error-of-omission-1533496398 [https://perma.cc/S3TF-YYFC]. 
 198 Datla & Revesz, supra note 75, at 839–40 (footnote omitted). 
 199 Coglianese, supra note 130, at 767 (footnote omitted). 
 200 Sally Katzen, Expand Centralized Regulatory Review to Independent Agencies, 
REG. REV. 3 (Aug. 9, 2011), https://www.law.upenn.edu/blogs/regblog/2011/08/expand-
centralized-regulatory-review-to-independent-agencies.html [https://perma.cc/BA6A-2SZ9]. 
 201 Coglianese, supra note 130, at 748. He also suggested that Congress could amend 
the Unfunded Mandates Reform Act to accomplish a similar goal. Id. at 749–53.  
 202 S. 3468, 112th Cong. § 3(c)(1)(A)–(B) (2012).  
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independent regulatory agencies, all of whom enjoy legislative bypass, 
communicated its concern about the bill.203 Its complaint was that: 
This [bill] would give any President unprecedented authority to influence the 
policy and rulemaking functions of independent regulatory agencies and would 
constitute a fundamental change in the role of independent regulatory agencies. 
Beyond injecting an Administration’s influence directly into our rulemaking, 
the bill would also interfere with our ability to promulgate rule critical to our 
missions in a timely manner and would likely result in unnecessary and 
unwarranted litigation in connection with our rules.204 
The bill was not enacted in the 112th Congress, but it has been reintroduced 
in more recent years.205 
Turning to the courts, Sharkey has proposed that courts give less deference 
to rules that do not undergo OIRA review.206 This would provide indirect 
incentives to the independent regulatory agencies to seek out OIRA review. So 
far, judges have not embraced this proposal as part of their heightened judicial 
review of agency regulatory analysis.207 This is perhaps because of Vermont 
Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Resources Defense Council,208 under 
which courts are restricted from imposing new procedural requirements on 
agencies.209 Hahn and Sunstein suggested that for-cause removal could be 
satisfied by an agency head’s defiance of a presidential order to conduct cost-
benefit analysis.210 
Calls for executive action to pull the independent regulatory agencies under 
OIRA review are either short on specifics211 or arguably unworkable. The most 
specific proposal for executive action included a draft of an executive order to 
replace EO 12,866.212 It provides a definition of “agencies” that simply includes 
 
 203 Letter from Ben S. Bernanke, Chairman, Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., 
Mary L. Schapiro, Chairman, SEC, Thomas J. Curry, Comptroller of the Currency, Martin 
J. Gruenberg, Acting Chairman, Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp., Richard Cordray, Dir., Consumer 
Fin. Prot. Bureau, & Debbie Matz, Chairman, Nat’l Credit Union Admin., to Senator Joseph 
Lieberman & Senator Susan Collins, at 1 (Oct. 26, 2012), https://buckleyfirm.com/uploads/ 
104/doc/10-26-12%20Agency%20Letter%20to%20Lieberman%20re%20S%203468.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/ZSF3-Z54J]. 
 204 Id. 
 205 S. 3208, 116th Cong. (2020); S. 1607, 114th Cong. (2015).  
 206 Sharkey, supra note 4, at 1592–93. An intriguing possibility for empirical work is 
to explore whether courts are effectively doing this without expressly mentioning it in their 
decisions.  
 207 See, e.g., id. at 1615. 
 208 Vt. Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, 435 U.S. 519 (1978). 
 209 Id. at 524. 
 210 See Hahn & Sunstein, supra note 197, at 1535–37. 
 211 E.g., C. Boyden Gray, The President’s Constitutional Power to Order Cost-Benefit 
Analysis and Centralized Review of Independent Agency Rulemaking 29 (unpublished 
manuscript) (on file with the Ohio State Law Journal).  
 212 Hahn & Sunstein, supra note 197, at 1542. 
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the “independent regulatory agencies” with a cross-reference to the Paperwork 
Reduction Act definition.213 There are many problems with such an approach. 
First, a solution that simply sweeps the independent regulatory agencies 
under OIRA’s purview fails to account for the insulating features given to it by 
Congress, which would make implementation unnecessarily chaotic. Without 
plans for dispute resolution, the ultimate constitutional question is likely to be 
called quickly: can the President fire an independent regulatory agency head as 
part of a regulatory dispute? As explained above, independent regulatory 
agencies have different levels of manifest independence, and treating them the 
same may backfire.  
Second, practical problems abound. The most obvious is that independent 
regulatory agencies are structured quite differently from other agencies, often 
with multimember bodies in charge of decision-making. As Coglianese notes:  
A multimember body simply could not engage in the kind of back-and-forth 
interactions contemplated by Executive Order 12,866. The practice of 
regulatory review under the Order routinely involves a working interchange 
and dialogue between an agency head (or designee) and the OIRA 
Administrator (or designee), a process which as a practical matter would not 
work well with multimember bodies. If the entire multimember body were 
taken to constitute the agency “head,” then the review process would become 
extremely cumbersome. Merely determining an agency’s position on OIRA’s 
feedback on the agency’s regulatory impact analysis would presumably 
necessitate a meeting with all commission members in accordance with various 
Government in the Sunshine Act requirements—including open meetings.214 
He also notes: “It is highly doubtful that White House officials would want 
to conduct their meetings with multimember commissions in the open.”215  
Third, OIRA would also face serious resource limitations if all of the 
independent regulatory agencies were suddenly subjected to review. OIRA has 
roughly fifty staff, only a subset of whom review draft agency regulations.216 
OIRA would likely need to secure additional resources and hire additional staff, 
both of which take time.217 On the agency side, suddenly being subject to OIRA 
review would trigger a need for a rapid ramp-up in capabilities that might prove 
extremely challenging.218  
 
 213 Id. at 1546. 
 214 Coglianese, supra note 130, at 747–48 (footnotes omitted). 
 215 Id. at 748 n.66. 
 216 Office of Management and Budget, Information and Regulatory Affairs, WHITE 
HOUSE, https://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/information-regulatory-affairs/ [https://perma.cc/ 
G3BU-NGN2]. 
 217 Coglianese, supra note 130, at 749. 
 218 See id. at 751 (“Pursuing a middle ground, rather than going to the extreme of 
involving OIRA in the work of independent agencies, would seem especially prudent in light 
of limitations in current assessments of the adequacy of regulatory analysis at independent 
agencies.”). 
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Prior proposals for executive action, therefore, have not offered a realistic 
plan for the executive that could proceed absent legislative action. While 
Congress could certainly resolve this issue at any time, there is a need for a new 
idea that leverages what Kagan has called the “dynamic charge” of the executive 
to solve this problem.219  
Writing about the benefits of centralized regulatory review, Kagan explains 
that improved regulatory decision-making is not merely a function of a process 
involving technocratic tools.220 That, she says, “does not fully explain a decision 
to lodge . . . these functions within the hands of the President.”221 Instead, she 
considers “the common bureaucratic pathologies of rigidity and torpor,” finding 
that “to achieve even technocratic goals, some real push from the political 
system is needed.”222 This “dynamism” is not something to be tolerated within 
a political system, but is indeed a critical aspect of it.223 
Applying this concept to the issue of independent regulatory agencies, the 
question remains how a president can invoke this dynamic charge to spur 
forward movement and not merely a backlash from the independent regulatory 
agencies themselves, or from Congress. 
With heightened judicial scrutiny of regulatory analysis, the independent 
regulatory agencies are uniquely disadvantaged compared to others when it 
comes to regulatory analysis. Despite calls for change, neither Congress, the 
courts, nor the President have altered the status quo. This state of affairs lags 
woefully behind the scholarship on agency independence, which has offered 
critical new insights. 
V. BESPOKE REGULATORY REVIEW 
To summarize, the rise of judicial review of agency regulatory analysis 
carries unique risks for independent regulatory agencies. The modern 
understanding of independent agencies, that they are both fluid and dynamic, 
calls into question the rigid, fixed list of independent regulatory agencies 
exempt from OIRA review. Calls to subject these agencies to OIRA review drift 
in the doldrums, waiting perhaps for a calibrated gust from the executive. The 
hydraulic movements of the courts, the legislature, and the executive, combined 
with insights from the academy, create the conditions for a new possibility: 
bespoke regulatory review. That is, a series of bilateral negotiations that result 
in memoranda of agreement between OIRA and the independent regulatory 
agencies.  
These agreements would provide for a form of OIRA review that is tailored 
to the specifics of an independent regulatory agency. There is precedent for this 
kind of negotiation and agreement, and perhaps it is best to view OIRA review 
 
 219 Kagan, supra note 3, at 2384. 
 220 Id. at 2340–41. 
 221 Id. at 2340. 
 222 Id. at 2341. 
 223 Id. at 2340–41. 
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as long having been the byproduct of many different forms of negotiation. 
Shortly after EO 12,866 was signed, then-Administrator Sally Katzen issued a 
memorandum that included a list of negotiated exemptions—both for certain 
agencies and for certain regulatory actions—from OIRA review.224 On a 
transactional level, the length of OIRA review can vary.225 And the contents of 
rules themselves might sometimes be the product of informal agreements 
between OIRA and agencies designed to avoid “tactical splitting” that would 
otherwise allow the rules to evade OIRA review.226 
Most recently, OIRA’s willingness to negotiate terms of its review with the 
Internal Revenue Service (IRS)227 suggests that there may be more flexibility to 
OIRA review than is well understood at present. This development opens up a 
lane to resolve this issue and connect independent regulatory agencies to 
OIRA’s technical expertise without unduly disrupting their independence. This 
section offers some examples for the content of the agreements based on past 
precedent and the unique needs of independent regulatory agencies. It closes 
with a discussion of the policy and other considerations associated with the 
proposal. 
A. Existing OIRA Review Agreements 
In April 2018, the U.S. Department of Treasury and the Office of 
Management and Budget (OMB) signed a memorandum of agreement 
(MOA)228 adjusting the scope of OIRA review. Before the IRS MOA, the 
prospect of OIRA review appeared to be an all-or-nothing proposition: either 
submit to the full set of OIRA review mechanisms or resist them all. The stakes 
of working with OIRA appeared very high, especially against a backdrop of 
rising executive power. The leadership of an independent regulatory agency, 
even if intrigued by the potential of working with OIRA, may have reasonably 
stayed away.  
However, increased judicial scrutiny of agency regulatory analyses 
augments previously low incentives for independent regulatory agencies to 
produce better analysis. Combined with the flexibility revealed by the IRS 
MOA, enough may have changed to make progress possible.  
 
 224 Memorandum from Sally Katzen, Adm’r, OIRA, to Heads of Exec. Dep’ts and 
Agencies, and Indep. Regulatory Agencies 11, 13–16 (Oct. 12, 1993), https://www.white 
house.gov/sites/whitehouse.gov/files/omb/assets/inforeg/eo12866_implementation_guidan
ce.pdf [https://perma.cc/Q7YY-BHFL]. 
 225 See generally, e.g., Alexander Bolton, Rachel Augustine Potter, & Sharece 
Thrower, Organizational Capacity, Regulatory Review, and the Limits of Political Control, 
32 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 242 (2016) (discussing, analyzing, and hypothesizing upon the reasons 
for varying OIRA review times).  
 226 Jennifer Nou & Edward H. Stiglitz, Regulatory Bundling, 128 YALE L.J. 1174, 1208 
(2019). 
 227 Bridget C.E. Dooling, OIRA’s Expanded Review of Tax Regulations and Its 
Surprising Implications, 3 BUS. ENTREPRENEURSHIP & TAX L. REV. 224, 235 (2019). 
 228 MEMORANDUM OF AGREEMENT, supra note 1, at 3.  
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There are two formal agreements in place between OIRA and agencies.229 
The first agreement sets out terms for OIRA to offer technical assistance for the 
draft regulations of an independent regulatory agency, the Commodity Futures 
Trading Commission; it holds OIRA at arm’s length and relies on the 
independent regulatory agency to begin consultations at its discretion.230 The 
second agreement renegotiates an older compromise between OIRA and a non-
independent agency, the IRS, which was largely excluded from OIRA review in 
the past.231 This second agreement is much closer to regular OIRA review than 
the first, with the agency submitting its rules to OIRA as a matter of routine, 
rather than at the agency’s initiative. The agreements are therefore quite 
different from each other, but together they suggest that this method of 
engagement—negotiation, resulting in an agreement—can be fruitful for both 
parties. 
1. Commodity Futures Trading Commission MOU 
In 2012, OIRA Administrator Cass Sunstein signed a memorandum of 
understanding (MOU)232 with the Commodity Futures Trading Commission 
(CFTC),233 which is an independent regulatory agency. This MOU was signed 
two years after the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection 
Act required the CFTC to consider costs and benefits in its rulemakings and 
orders.234 CFTC faced litigation challenging its Dodd-Frank Act 
implementation rulemakings on, inter alia, the quality of its regulatory impact 
 
 229 There may be other, less formal arrangements between OIRA and certain agencies 
to permit for informal consultation. OIRA works with independent regulatory agencies to 
implement the Paperwork Reduction Act, Congressional Review Act, as well as to issue the 
Semi-Annual Unified Regulatory Agenda, and therefore the staff have informal relationships 
with each other even though OIRA does not review their rules under EO 12866. The 
Federalist Society, Opening Address: Hon. Neomi Rao [EBR6], YOUTUBE (Apr. 25, 2018), 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=IcteDU2hgGw [https://perma.cc/N4YE-XDKN] 
[hereinafter Opening Address] (discussing independent agencies at 17:24). 
 230 See Jamila Trindle, CFTC Taps Help for Cost Analysis on New Rules, WALL ST. J. 
(May 10, 2012), https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB100014240527023040703045773961926 
53277890 [https://perma.cc/CL6W-9VC5]. 
 231 Dooling, supra note 227, at 229. 
 232 Agencies often use memoranda of understanding (MOUs) or memoranda of 
agreement (MOAs) to memorialize the results of an interagency negotiation. See Farber & 
O’Connell, supra note 134, at 1409–10. 
 233 OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET & U.S. COMMODITY FUTURES TRADING COMM’N, 
MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING (May 9, 2012), https://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/white 
house.gov/files/omb/inforeg/inforeg/regpol/oira_cftc_mou_2012.pdf [https://perma.cc/BA6 
V-P9KC] [hereinafter MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING]. 
 234 Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111–
203, § 115, 124 Stat. 1376, 1403 (2010). 
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analysis.235 The MOU, signed in the wake of this litigation, sets out a process 
for OIRA staff to provide technical assistance to CFTC during the 
implementation of the Dodd-Frank Act, with an emphasis on advice to inform 
CFTC’s consideration of costs and benefits in proposed and final rulemaking 
proceedings.236 When the MOU was announced, Commissioner Scott O’Malia 
“praised the greater cooperation with OIRA, which he said holds the gold 
standard for cost-benefit analysis.”237 
The MOU states that it “is set forth for the purpose of permitting [OIRA] to 
provide technical assistance to the [CFTC].”238 It provides that OIRA may 
provide technical assistance but that in accepting such assistance CFTC is not 
subjecting itself to OIRA review under EO 12,866.239 As such, the CFTC MOU 
keeps OIRA at arm’s length, with CFTC contacting OIRA for assistance only at 
its discretion.240 This feature indicates that CFTC perceived the full version of 
OIRA review to be incompatible with its independence. The MOU also provides 
that sharing information under the arrangement does not disrupt any lawful 
privilege and confidentiality and that the MOU shall continue until both parties 
revise or modify it.241 
No other independent regulatory agency is known to have executed 
agreements with OIRA to fulfill a similar technical assistance function, despite 
some evidence that the CFTC MOU has been at least modestly successful.242 
There could be several reasons why this OIRA technical assistance model has 
not spread. First, other agencies simply might not know about it as an option. 
Although it did get some press initially,243 it has not been a particularly 
newsworthy arrangement since it was established. Second, OIRA might not be 
actively trying to encourage other agencies to sign on to a similar arrangement, 
 
 235 Revesz, supra note 4, at 571; Garrett F. Bishop & Michael A. Coffee, Note, A Tale 
of Two Commissions: A Compendium of the Cost-Benefit Analysis Requirements Faced by 
the SEC & CFTC, 32 REV. BANKING & FIN. L. 565, 605–06 (2013); Trindle, supra note 230.  
 236 MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING, supra note 233. 
 237 Trindle, supra note 230. Commissioner Bart Chilton, however, dismissed the MOU 
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 238 MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING, supra note 233. 
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would not affect CFTC’s independence. See Trindle, supra note 230. 
 240 See Exec. Order No. 12,866, 58 Fed. Reg. 51,735 (Sept. 30, 1993); MEMORANDUM 
OF UNDERSTANDING, supra note 232. 
 241 MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING, supra note 233. 
 242 See COMM. ON CAPITAL MKTS. REGULATION, A BALANCED APPROACH TO COST-
BENEFIT ANALYSIS REFORM 8 (Oct. 2013), https://www.capmktsreg.org/wp-content/uploads 
/2018/10/A-Balanced-Approach-to-Cost-Benefit-Analysis-Reform.pdf [https://perma.cc/ 
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increased since OIRA began providing technical support, and the length, detail, and quality 
of the analysis have improved to a degree.”). 
 243 E.g., Trindle, supra note 230. 
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either because the arrangement has not been viewed as a good investment of 
resources, or simply due to other priorities facing the small office.244 Third, 
OIRA technical assistance might not have been sufficiently appealing to 
independent regulatory agencies to justify the additional time and resources 
required to build new working relationships with OIRA. Fourth, an agency 
might perceive that any interaction with OIRA related to draft regulations places 
its independence at risk.245 Fifth, the agencies might be disinterested in 
receiving the advice, choosing to proceed on their own.246 Sixth, and perhaps 
least intuitively, an agency’s willingness to receive technical assistance might 
not be a strong enough commitment to allow it to follow through on the kinds 
of analytical and organizational changes that could follow from OIRA’s 
analytical review. 
On this last point, Sharkey has explained that both judicial review and OIRA 
review are “information forcing,” meaning that they result in “the development 
of more robust agency records subject to oversight, all in the pursuit of better 
(i.e., more rational and coherent) agency decision-making.”247 This activity 
comes at a resource cost to agencies. They might need to hire economists and 
other professionals to prepare the kind of information that OIRA review 
seeks.248  
In addition, OIRA review under EO 12,866 asks questions that agencies are 
sometimes reluctant to answer. For example, EO 12,866 directs agencies to 
explain the problem it aims to address with its revised rule.249 Although this 
sounds like a modest request, agencies sometimes argue that they are under a 
statutory requirement to act, rather than explaining the problem to which they 
are responding.250 EO 12,866 also directs agencies to assess alternative 
approaches to addressing the problem that has been identified.251 But agencies 
sometimes experience pressure to suggest that the proposed regulatory approach 
is the only option, rather than acknowledging that there might be other 
alternatives.252 
A technical assistance model, which allows the agency to take or leave 
advice on any particular rule, without a larger commitment to the endeavor, 
therefore may lead to anemic uptake of OIRA’s advice provided under such a 
 
 244 See, e.g., Exec. Order No. 13,771, § 1, 82 Fed. Reg. 9339 (Jan. 30, 2017) (creating 
the regulatory two-for-one and regulatory budget initiatives). 
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 246 See supra notes 154–61 and accompanying text. 
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 248 Id. at 1622. 
 249 Exec. Order No. 12,866, § 1(b)(1), 58 Fed. Reg. 51,735 (Sept. 30, 1993). 
 250 See Jerry Ellig & Michael Horney, Statutory Delegation, Agency Authority, and the 
Asymmetry of Impact Analysis, 7 THEORY AND PRAC. LEGIS. 227, 229, 249 (2019). 
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model. That may, in turn, help explain what could be OIRA’s lack of enthusiasm 
for using its limited resources to provide such technical assistance. 
2. Internal Revenue Service MOA 
Until recently, OIRA review—distinct from OIRA technical assistance—
has been framed as an all-or-nothing choice. But in April 2018, the U.S. 
Department of Treasury and OMB signed an MOA253 that signals new 
flexibility. The 2018 MOA expanded the scope of IRS regulatory actions that 
would come in to OIRA for review prior to publication.254 IRS is not an 
independent regulatory agency but it had been able to function like one for most 
of its regulations.255 An MOA from 1983, ratified in 1993, limited the type of 
actions that would fall under OIRA review.256 In 2017, EO 13,789 directed 
Treasury and OMB to “review and, if appropriate, reconsider the scope and 
implementation of the existing exemption for certain tax regulations from the 
review process set forth in Executive Order 12866 and any successor order.”257  
The result of that negotiation was a new MOA that negotiated not just the 
types of actions that would be subject to OIRA review, but other critical terms 
as well.258 This included how long review would take, including assurance that 
OIRA would review some actions more quickly than the EO 12,866 timeframe 
of ninety days; analytical issues such as how to measure certain thresholds for 
review; a phase-in period; and dispute resolution procedures.259 The MOA 
terms signal that OIRA might be open to negotiating the terms of its review 
beyond what was previously understood to be negotiable. Former OIRA 
Administrator Neomi Rao acknowledged the flexibility in remarks shortly after 
she signed the MOA: “The basic structure [of the agreement] follows the regular 
OIRA centralized review process. However, we have provided for shorter time 
frames for review, particularly for certain tax reform rules, and we’ve also 
included provisions that account for the unique revenue-raising function of 
Treasury.”260 
Rather than OIRA review as a one-size-fits-all proposition, the IRS MOA 
shows willingness to negotiate on meaningful terms. Compared to the CFTC 
MOU, in which CFTC holds OIRA at arm’s length and stops short of full OIRA 
review, the IRS MOA applies OIRA review with what can be viewed as some 
 
 253 MEMORANDUM OF AGREEMENT, supra note 1, at 3.  
 254 Dooling, supra note 227, at 230–31. 
 255 Id. at 232 n.66. 
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concessions on OIRA’s part. This is critical new information for independent 
regulatory agencies. 
Signaling the relevance of this approach to the independent regulatory 
agencies, then-Administrator Rao noted: “[B]eyond the specifics this new MOA 
recognizes the importance of the principle of centralized regulatory review even 
in a context such as tax. These broader principles could also be extended to the 
traditionally-understood independent agencies.”261 
B. Potential Independent Regulatory Agency MOA Provisions 
If an independent regulatory agency might consider some form of OIRA 
review as a way to improve its analysis, it might seek several types of provisions 
in a MOA. This could include dispute resolution, phase-in, technical assistance, 
review timing, disclosure provisions, and more. This section sketches some 
potential terms and starts with the issue of political control. 
1. Political Control 
The issue of political control of decision-making is a threshold matter 
because it is likely critical to an independent regulatory agency’s calculation of 
whether to negotiate with OIRA. It should also inform whether the president 
directs OIRA to negotiate. To enter into negotiation, both parties may need to 
disarm somewhat. The president may need to set aside the rhetoric of the unitary 
executive, and the independent regulatory agency may need to set aside the 
rhetoric of the “constitutional force field”262 described above. How else could 
they justify the negotiation? This does not require either party to fully abandon 
these ideas, but to soften their respective postures for the sake of negotiation.263  
Ultimately, the strength of an agency’s manifest independence vis à vis 
executive power will likely determine how any possible agreements are 
structured. For agencies with a weaker claim to independence, submitting to 
some form of OIRA review does not seem to be an improper erosion of their 
independence. Rather, it corrects for the error of over-extending independence. 
These weaker agencies might be willing to enter into negotiation now because 
of the specter of Supreme Court decisions that could undermine their 
independence.264 Agencies with a stronger claim to independence will likely be 
able to fend off a stronger form of OIRA review.265  
 
 261 Id. (discussing the importance of the principle of centralized regulatory review at 
17:40–17:57). 
 262 See supra note 121 and accompanying text. 
 263 This may very well be a non-starter for some, but it is arguably the hardening of 
these two postures that has left the issue of OIRA review of independent regulatory agencies 
at a stalemate. 
 264 See generally, e.g., Seila Law LLC v. Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau, 140 S. Ct. 2183 
(2020).  
 265 See Exec. Order No. 12,866, § 6(a)(3), 58 Fed. Reg. 51,735 (Sept. 30, 1993).  
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For the president and OIRA, perhaps the biggest question is whether they 
could or should negotiate away aspects of White House political oversight that 
accompanies its review of other agency rules. Supporters of the unitary 
executive theory might reflexively say no, but the status quo of exempting these 
agencies suggests the political limits of that theory. Consider the IRS MOA as 
an example. IRS sits within a cabinet agency,266 and yet OIRA negotiated with 
them.267 What accounts for that behavior, if the executive’s power is complete? 
The flexibility OIRA revealed in the MOA stands in sharp relief to its common 
portrayal as a powerful, if not omnipotent, office.268 The IRS MOA is evidence 
that this portrayal is likely more caricature than is currently appreciated, 
reflecting that OIRA’s political power with respect to any particular decision is 
generally subject to countervailing political forces.269 Contrary to the caricature, 
OIRA, an agent of the president, might not be able to impose its will without 
giving up something in return.270 
This article has already explained that the threat of judicial review may 
encourage independent regulatory agencies to see some form of OIRA review. 
OIRA, on the other hand, might be willing to negotiate in service to at least two 
goals. One goal is greater political oversight of particular regulatory actions on 
behalf of the president, which is facilitated by OIRA review.271 An important 
second goal is improved regulatory decision-making as a result of interagency 
coordination on overlapping policy areas as well as the use of regulatory 
analysis techniques including, but not limited to, cost-benefit analysis. The latter 
goal is perhaps more easily understood as a “good government” objective 
though many, including Kagan, would argue that strong presidential control of 
agency action is good for government as well.272 Nevertheless, cleaving a 
distinction between these two general goals is critical to understanding why 
OIRA might be willing to trade these goals off in a negotiation. It is unclear that 
they would, but the flexibility in the IRS MOA at least suggests the possibility 
that they could.  
There is also the possibility that the negotiation is not a zero-sum game. 
Michael Livermore argues that dexterity with cost-benefit analysis itself can 
give an agency some insulation from political control.273 If that is correct, 
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acceptance of some form of OIRA review need not imply political surrender for 
an independent regulatory agency.  
2. Dispute Resolution 
Turning to specific provisions, an MOA could establish proper channels of 
communication, anticipate disagreements, and specify one or more elevation 
points for resolution.274 If the agency does not have formal positions until after 
its commissioners vote, an MOA could specify whether someone at the agency, 
such as its chair or executive director, is empowered to oversee OIRA review 
on its behalf prior to a vote, or whether the agency would need a formal vote 
prior to a draft being sent to OIRA for review. These are nuances that will be 
unique to each agency’s authorities, structure, and culture, and they lend 
themselves to bilateral, as opposed to blanket, policymaking. 
For dispute resolution, staff could elevate issues to OIRA’s Deputy 
Administrator275 and his appropriate counterpart at the independent regulatory 
agency, and then to the OIRA Administrator and her appropriate counterpart, if 
needed. The agreement would ideally specify OIRA’s appropriate counterparts 
at the agency, such as the executive director, chief economist, chief of staff, or 
chairman, to provide an explicit pathway to resolving disputes.  
Parties might find that creating a series of elevation points allows them to 
compromise on issues rather than immediately calling the constitutional 
question of whether the president can require the independent regulatory agency 
to follow his direction. If that does not resolve the issue, however, particularly 
for an agency with a stronger claim to independence, a term could be included 
to allow OIRA to stand down and file a comment in the agency’s public docket 
detailing any remaining concerns. This is just one configuration that could be 
used to recognize independence where it exists, but there are likely others that 
could emerge through negotiation. Adding process steps in this general manner, 
however, could give both parties the opportunity to reap the benefits of 
productive conflict276 while still offering a way out. 
3. Phase-Ins and Technical Assistance 
Another practical concern independent regulatory agencies might have 
about OIRA review is the question of relevant resources and expertise. They 
might be concerned that OIRA lacks staff and expertise in the legal authorities, 
procedures, and policy approaches underpinning the agency’s work. This was a 
 
 274 Cf. Kagan, supra note 3, at 2288–90 (discussing the merits of a formal dispute 
resolution policy). 
 275 This is the top career official in OIRA. SUBCOMM. ON COM. AND ADMIN. L., 109TH 
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concern with the IRS MOA.277 An agency might be concerned about its own 
lack of expertise with the economic principles and analytical framework that 
OIRA uses for regulatory analysis.278 A term allowing for a phase-in, like the 
one in the IRS MOA,279 could help smooth the transition and ramp up 
expectations over time. This would allow both parties to hire and train additional 
staff, if needed, and assuming adequate resources to do so.280 Parties could also 
consider a term about mutual technical assistance, perhaps including periodic 
staff rotations between OIRA and the agency. 
4. Review Process 
The parties could also negotiate the review process. The number of days for 
review, negotiated in the IRS MOA, is a good example.281 Parties could also 
agree to use a “chess clock” to handle the way days are counted, to discourage 
either side from running the clock during review. Or break it into phases of 
review with different time periods. Beyond the duration of review, parties could 
negotiate at what point OIRA review takes place consistent with the workflows 
(e.g., voting procedures) of the independent regulatory agency.  
5. Transparency 
Another term that could be helpful is one that reconciles the various 
information disclosure requirements that apply to regulatory review. OIRA has 
disclosure requirements under EO 12,866282 and it otherwise relies on the 
deliberative process privilege to promote candor by cloaking its interagency 
work.283 Independent regulatory agencies, however, are generally subject to the 
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Sunshine Act,284 which, as discussed above, is somewhat in tension with the 
deliberative process privilege depending on how review is conducted. The 
CFTC MOU handled this with a term that asserted that the MOU did not disrupt 
any lawful privilege or confidentiality.285 In areas where materials covered by 
the Sunshine Act and the deliberative process privilege seem to overlap, e.g., 
written materials sent from OIRA to the independent regulatory agency’s 
commissioners, a more specific MOA term could help set expectations on both 
sides, as well as for the public. 
Although this section has offered some examples of terms that the parties 
could negotiate, there are surely more, such as the scope of review (e.g., what 
types of actions would be reviewed), level of analytical rigor for different levels 
or types of actions, evaluation periods, renegotiation timeframes, exit clauses, 
sunsets, and limits on judicial review. The MOAs could be customized to cover 
what the parties need, which does not necessarily need to be lengthy. The CFTC 
MOU was only one page.286 The 2018 OMB-Treasury MOA was three pages,287 
reflecting greater complexity of the arrangement. 
While they are unlikely to be legally binding on the parties in a manner 
enforceable in court, MOAs are a way for agencies to document and commit to 
mutual understanding.288 Both parties to an MOA can benefit from that certainty 
as they navigate new ways of working together.  
An open and pressing question is which terms the parties would willingly 
endure to secure the benefits of increased review. As proposed here, the 
president would not attempt to use presidential action to force the agencies to 
the table with OIRA.289 Rather, the president could instruct OIRA, formally 
through an executive order or presidential memorandum or informally through 
other instructions to the OIRA Administrator, to contact one or more agencies 
to begin negotiations. If, in the course of meetings, OIRA is able to make a good 
enough case for some form of collaboration, this might lead to an agreement. 
The risk in any genuine negotiation is that it will not result in agreement. 
Allowing the parties to walk away is a way to ensure that they retain what is 
essential about each of them. 
C. Considerations  
The use of bilateral MOAs to subject independent regulatory agencies to 
some form of regulatory review, a concept that this paper is calling bespoke 
regulatory review, has several policy considerations.  
 
 284 The Government in the Sunshine Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552b(a)(1) (1976). 
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First, there may be other ways to get independent regulatory agencies the 
technical expertise they need to prepare higher-quality regulatory analyses. One 
idea is that the independent regulatory agencies could pool their resources to 
stand up, or request that Congress create, an OIRA-like office that services 
many agencies.290 One might argue such an approach avoids political control 
described above and creates constructive analytical competition between OIRA 
and an OIRA-like entity that might be salutary for regulatory analysis as a 
whole.  
Kagan considered such a possibility of “a less political kind of central 
institution,” concluding that it would “slight the . . . important norm of 
democratic accountability.”291 It also fails to anticipate the value of the “real 
push from the political system” that she describes as not merely tolerable, but 
essential.292  
With regard to analytical competition, an important clarification is that 
OIRA review does not exist to ensure uniformity of agency analysis. Instead, 
OIRA review can balance analytical rigor against the particulars of statutory 
requirements and other practical considerations, such as the state of the evidence 
relevant to the regulatory issue at stake. For example, the analysis for a brand-
new regulation is likely to be highly speculative,293 and should contain caveats 
that make that transparent, while an incremental change to a long-lived 
regulation should be able to draw upon more evidence. With a few exceptions 
set out in Circular A–4, agencies reviewed by OIRA enjoy flexibility on 
analytical approaches, and that allows for analytical innovation.294  
Also, OIRA is able to convene dialogues across the federal government, 
often with outcomes and approaches that are unique. It is these coordination 
benefits that tend to be underappreciated.295 Agencies, “if left to their own 
devices, would focus on their own missions without devoting sufficient attention 
to government-wide priorities.”296 While this may seem like exactly the reason 
Congress gave them independent features, it can lead to inadequate coordination 
across agencies working in similar areas.297 For these reasons, a separate OIRA-
like office is not a superior choice. 
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Second, bespoke regulatory review rationalizes the currently uneven 
application of economic analysis to draft regulatory actions. Coglianese calls 
this type of analysis an opportunity for regulators to “look before they leap.”298 
Many have noted the practical limitations of economic analysis in the regulatory 
context.299 While it undoubtedly needs improvement, the alternative—
regulatory analysis that willfully ignores what economics can tell us about costs, 
benefits, incentives, and unintended consequences—is not an acceptable path. 
Although it had a controversial start, requiring agencies to conduct economic 
analysis of regulations has been U.S. regulatory policy since the 1980s.300 Even 
if one objects to OIRA’s political role, there is no reason to exclude independent 
regulatory agencies from this type of analysis categorically.301  
Third, this approach offers independent regulatory agencies more ready 
access to another tool to address defects in regulatory analysis that lead to remand 
upon judicial review. Conducting economic analysis in a manner consistent with 
other agencies, and having OIRA review that analysis is a way to bolster analysis 
and protect it more successfully from remand. Although it will take agency 
resources to conduct this analysis, there are at least some offsetting savings to be 
had as a result of fewer remanded or vacated rules. 
Fourth, it offers a way to resolve a long-running stalemate between the 
president and the independent regulatory agencies, in a way that largely side-
steps challenging legal and political questions and accounts for practical 
difficulties. Datla and Revesz suggest as an alternative to the flawed, binary view 
of agency independence: “[T]he President can constitutionally take any action 
with respect to independent agencies that he could with respect to the executive 
agencies unless a statutory provision says otherwise.”302 But in the realpolitik of 
agency independence, that action may need to entail political restraint on the part 
of the president, particularly for those independent regulatory agencies with 
stronger claims to their independence. And, as shown in both the CFTC and the 
IRS examples, the president need not personally intervene to extend OIRA’s 
review to parts of the executive. In the case of IRS, the president tasked the 
parties with working out an arrangement.303 In the case of CFTC, the parties 
appear to have negotiated of their own volition.304 Under an MOA with an 
independent regulatory agency, the president can acknowledge the relative 
independence of these agencies while still taking steps to improve regulatory 
policy. 
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This proposal also relies on the independent regulatory agency’s willingness 
to enter into an MOA. All agency heads, not just ones thought to be independent, 
have options in the face of presidential overtures and directives.305 They can 
willingly come to the table, or they can resist in a variety of ways, including 
public statements of disagreement.306 The political will theory described earlier 
suggests that an agency with a greater claim to independence will likely be able 
to resist strong forms of political review. A president, in turn, would have to 
choose whether and how to proceed: “[T]he President can press on and attempt 
to bring the agency around to his view. Whether presidents do so will depend on 
how much political capital they are willing to spend rather than how the agency 
is categorized.”307 All of these factors inform whether a negotiation would take 
place in the first instance, and result in agreement in the second instance.308 
Fifth, presidential action to bring the independent regulatory agencies under 
OIRA review without accommodations for their independence would likely be 
viewed as aggressive and a “major shift in the norms and practices of 
autonomous regulatory decision making that have long prevailed at independent 
agencies.”309 It would likely provoke Congressional backlash and legislation or 
other oversight activity that aims to restore the prior balance.310 As Alan 
Morrison put it:  
[E]ven raising that question [of agency independence] is likely to cause a furor 
on Capitol Hill, for few ideas seem to offend members of the two Commerce 
committees more than suggesting that independents should be abolished . . . it 
is surely a fact of political life that any such efforts would be met with 
substantial resistance.311  
Datla and Revesz also acknowledge this dynamic, noting that if the 
president directed the independent agencies to comply with OIRA review, 
“Congress can of course exempt agencies from the regulatory review 
requirement, just as it has done in response to previous presidential assertions 
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of control over the administrative state.”312 An aggressive, uniform action is 
more likely to provoke a response.313 Negotiation, however, has a lighter touch. 
It is harder to argue that it is a form of aggression if the independent regulatory 
agency agrees to it. 
Sixth, negotiation takes time and other resources. There are more than a 
dozen independent regulatory agencies.314 It took Treasury and OMB almost one 
year from the date of EO 13,789 to the date of the IRS MOA.315 One year per 
negotiation might be too low of an estimate because IRS does not present the 
complexities of an independent regulatory agency, but if OIRA took on one 
negotiation per year that would be almost two decades before these negotiations 
were completed. Of course, OIRA could take on more than one negotiation at a 
time. But as a small agency of roughly fifty people, OIRA could get overwhelmed 
if it tries to move too fast. An advantage of an incremental MOA process is that it 
allows for “managerial innovation”316 in negotiating tactics and potential terms 
along the way, as well as requests for additional resources as needed.  
This is not an exhaustive list, but even this sketch suggests that there are 
many considerations that will ultimately play into any decision to extend bespoke 
regulatory review to independent regulatory agencies. This article offers this 
proposal, potential terms, and some considerations to shine light on a potential 
pathway, even if its exact contours are uncertain. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
This article has shown that the rise in judicial review of agency regulatory 
analysis poses acute risks for the independent regulatory agencies, which are not 
subject to OIRA review. These agencies are isolated from OIRA due, in part, to 
a misunderstanding about the nature of agency independence; it is far more 
complex than is widely appreciated. Until recently, regulatory review under EO 
12,866 was considered to be a one-size-fits-all set of procedures, but new 
agreements negotiated by OIRA show that it is not. Bespoke regulatory review 
is an alternative way of conceptualizing OIRA review. It allows independent 
regulatory agencies to negotiate with OIRA towards regulatory review terms that 
are mutually beneficial. The ultimate beneficiary, though, is the public, which 
will benefit from regulatory decisions informed by better regulatory analysis. 
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